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INTERNATIONAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS:
UNITED STATES & CANADA
DELLAS W. LEE*
B ECAUSE of Canada's proximity to the United States and the stability of
Canada's commercial and political economy, typical international credit
risks1 are of little consquence in commercial transactions between citizens of
these two countries. As a result the vast majority of continental commercial
transactions are consummated through credit mechanisms such as open account,
time and sight drafts, without resort to security devices. Indeed the question
arises whether security devices are used in these transactions at all, and if
they are, which ones, to what extent, and what are their functions. Four classes
of security devices may be encountered in international commercial transac-
tions: the letter of credit,2 the corporate and personal guarantee,3 credit insur-
ance,4 and the chattel security agreement, all of which are of the same generic
nature in that they are used to insure the meeting of obligations. However,
only one of these devices will be examined in this study-the chattel security
agreement-and then only as it is used in loans and sales by citizens of the
United States to citizens of Canada. Incidental reference to the other devices
will be made initially, but only to establish the role played by chattel security
agreements in relevant transactions. This selection has been made partly because
the foreign law which governs security agreements is likely to have greater im-
pact on American citizens than foreign law governing the other security devices,
and partly because of interesting recent developments in the field relating to
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1. Credit risks which should be evaluated prior to the estabishment of a line of credit
for international commercial transactions are related to (a) money: the availability of ap-
propriate currency, easily convertible at a fair exchange rate; (b) politics: political stability
and the right of investors to retain or dispose of the currency generated by the investment;
(c) the duration of credit; and (d) the uses to which the credit will be put. Harfield,
Credit Mechanisms and Security Devices, 3 Inst. on Private Inv. Abroad, 431-34 (1961).
2. Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code, 790-827
(1964); Mentschikoff, Uniform Commercial Code Handbook, 153 (1964); Funk, Letters of
Credit: U.C.C. Article 5 and the Uniform Customs and Practice, 11 How. LJ. 88, 107
(1965); Harrfield, Letters of Credit, 76 Banking L.T. 93, 94 (1959); Waldmann, Increasing
the Transferability of Documentary Letters of Credit, 8 Harv. Int'l L.J. 116 (1967); Wiley,
How To Use Letters of Credit in Financing the Sale of Goods, 20 Bus. Law. 495, 505 (1965).
3. Suretyship is properly regarded as a security device. G. Osborne, Secured Transac-
tions 1, 2 (1967).
4. 12 U.S.C. § 635(c) (1961). This form of security has been around for some time
in many of the European countries, but was instituted in the United States as recently as
1962 following the organization of the Foreign Credit Insurance Association (hereinafter
referred to as FCIA) pursuant to the authorization of Congress. The FCIA cooperates with
the Export Import Bank (hereinafter referred to as Eximbank) in providing comprehensive
credit insurance. The alleged purpose of the organization is to promote the export of Ameri-
can goods by guaranteeing the payment of an exporter's accounts receivable under various
conditions. See S. Surrey & C. Shaw, A Lawyer's Guide to International Business Transac-
tions 350 (1964); Nicholson, The Program of the Foreign Credit Insurance Associaiton as
Adequate Export Incentive, 18 Bus. Law. 483 (1963).
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the adaptation of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code to the needs of
Canadian provinces.
A glance at the extent of American investment in Canada and at statistics
revealing the volume of exports to Canadian purchasers will be helpful in
assessing the role of chattel security devices. No data has been found which
clearly differentiates between the amount of debt and equity capital invested
in Canada, and thus the nature of collateral used to secure loans-whether real
or personal-is not determinable. However, total American investment, direct
and indirect, mostly in mines, oil wells and factories, is over twenty-one billion
dollars.5 In the area of sales, statistics disclose that between 1960 and 1964
the volume of exports to Canada in terms of billions of Canadian dollars was
as follows: 6
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
3.689 3.866 4.302 4.447 5.168
A recent survey by Dun and Bradstreet indicates that, depending on the type
of goods involved, the frequency of use of credit mechanisms in payment for
exports to Canada in 1964 ranged as follows:
7
Letters of credit--cash 0% to 4%
Sight draft 0% to 11%
Time draft 0% to 5%
Open account 86% to 100%
The survey, which is conducted annually, requests no information concerning
the use of security devices other than the letter of credit, although it may be
assumed that the other three devices are being used to some degree.
To test the validity of this hypothesis, communications with banks, ex-
porters, and attorneys in various parts of the United States and to a lesser
extent in Canada, was made by questionnaire, letter and interview. These sources
have confirmed what was earlier assumed: that all four of the security devices
in one form or another are currently being employed to finance the export of a
small percentage of goods sold to Canadian buyers, as well as to secure loans to
Canadian borrowers. 8 The over-all dollar value of goods financed or loans made
5. Canada's Next 100 Years, U.S. News and World Report, April 10, 1967, at 86, 90.
The most recent issue of the [1966] Can. Y.B. 1041, sets the figure at 20.48 billion dollars
for 1963. Canada's gross national product for 1964 was 47.003 billion dollars. [1966] Can.
Y.B. 1018.
6. Y.B. Int'l Trade Stat. 145, U.N. Doc. St/Stat. G/15 (1964).
7. Dun and Bradstreet, Business Abroad: 1967 World Trade Data Year Book Issue
32-33 (1966).
8. In June, 1967, questionnaires were sent to fifty manufacturers or wholesalers who
export to Canada, and similar questionnaires, nutatis mutandis, were sent to fifty of the
largest banks in the United States. Fifty-two per cent of the exporters and seventy per cent
of the banks responded. No attempt was made to obtain specific per centages on the fre-
quency of use of the various security devices and credit mechanisms, beyond learning that
they were in fact being used in United States-Canada commercial transactions; nor was
any attempt made to distinguish between types or classifications of commodities exported
and variations in practices related thereto.
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through relevant devices cannot be derived from the survey, which was not
intended to be statistical on this point, but the survey clearly reveals that
security devices do play a part in commercial transactions between citizens of
the United States and Canada. With this fact established, attention will now
be focused on the role of the security agreement in continental transactions.
FOREIGN LAW
Certain questions which are of little or no concern in domestc transactions
loom rather large when the security agreement is being considered for use in
an international transaction. The first question is which law determines the
validity of the device, assuming the device is available at all. Before the gen-
eral adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code the prevailing view in the
United States was that the law of the situs of the goods determined the efficacy
of a security interest vis-&-vis third parties where the goods had been removed
from one jurisdiction to another with the knowledge or consent of the mort-
gagee or owner,9 presumably on the unstated theory that creditors of the situs
would have no reasonable means of ascertaining the existence of an outstanding
security interest perfected in another jurisdiction. This rule has been qualified
somewhat by U.C.C. § 9-103, but the effect of the second sentence of sub-
section (3)-the most relevant to international secured sales transactions-is




Method of Letter personal Credit Chattel
financing of guaran- Insur- security Open Sight Time
credit: tees: ance: devices: account draft draft
Sometime: 16% 8% 4% 12% 84% 32% 20%
Exclusively: 0% 0% 0% 0% 36% 0% 0%
Response from Banks:
Banks having experience:
1. Financing exports to Canada where
(a) chattel security devices are used 23%(b) FCIA is used 6%
2. Making loans to Canadian citizens (including corporations):
(a) Banks not indicating whether loans are on a secured or
unsecured basis: 26%
(b) Banks making unsecured loans 14%
(c) Banks making loans secured by a chattel security device 23%*
(d) Banks making loans secured by guarantee 23%*
* Some of the banks make loans secured by chattel security devices as
well as by guarantee, so that the percentages represented in (c) and (d)
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Even in the case of unsecured loans
a thin margin of security is sometimes taken in the form of a "negative
pledge," i.e., an agreement by the Canadian borrower "not to mortgage,
pledge, assign, etc. certain or all property to any other creditor . .. !
Letter from John M. Walbridge, Ass't Vice-Pres., First Nat'l City Bank
of New York, to Professor Dellas W. Lee, June 7, 1967.
9. Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U.S. 664 (1876); Green v. Van
Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 307 (1866); Green v. Van Buskirk, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 139
(1868); Boston Law Book Co. v. Hathorn, 119 Vt. 416, 127 A.2d 120 (1956).
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had a law similar to U.C.C. § 9-103, compliance with the chattel security law
of the intended permanent situs would be necessary. It would be surprising
therefore, although not impossible, to find that a foreign country would give
extra territorial validity to a security interest under these circumstances when
foreign states of the secured party's own country would not. Thus it is essential
for an American attorney advising an American client to consult the relevant
foreign law to determine the availability and the validity of a security interest
at the intended permanent situs of the collateral. In this instance the relevant
foreign law is the law of Canada. Since no Canadian case appears to have spe-
cifically discussed the significance of a secured party's knowledge of or consent
to removal of the collateral from the United States to Canada, we can only
speculate on its relevance in future decisions. But it is clear that in some prov-
inces an American secured party would be defeated by third parties irrespective
of knowledge or consent,'0 so that it might be reasonable to infer that a Cana-
dian court would invalidate the security interest in a case where knowledge of
or consent to the removal existed. Where the goods are already in Canada at
the time they become subjected to a security interest in favor of an American
citizen, whether by sale or by loan, it would seem even more improbable that
the security interest would be protected vis-A-vis third parties without having
been perfected in accordance with relevant provincial law.11
Assuming the international credit risks are favorable, 12 after determining
the applicable law and the availability of the security agreement, other im-
portant questions must be answered before the security agreement can be con-
sidered a reliable security device. For example, how is the security agreement
created and perfected? May the secured party realize on the security in the
event of default by the debtor? Do foreign tax consequences arise during per-
formance of the agreement or on default? Will use of a security device con-
stitute "doing business" in one of the provinces, and what effect will this have
on the validity of the security agreement assuming the foreign corporation has
not "qualified"?" Many other relevant questions could be raised, but these are
sufficient to indicate the nature of the problem.
10. Traders Fin. Corp. v. Dawson Implements, Ltd., 26 W.W.R. 561, 15 D.L.R.2d
515 (B.C. 1958) (conditional sales contract) ; contra, Gosline v. Dunbar, 32 N.B. 325 (1894)
(chattel mortgage) ; Jones v. Twohey, 1 Alta. 267, 8 W.L.R. 295 (1908) (chattel mortgage).
However, some current conditional sales acts specifically require foreign vendors to comply
with the provincial statute. See, e.g., The Conditional Sales Act, [1961) B.C. Stat. c. 9,
§ 6(b); Conditional Sales Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 12 (1960). Actually, common law
and civil law jurisdictions have choice of law rules quite similar to the pre-Code rule of
the United States. Dicey, Conflict of Laws 819-22 (7th ed. 1958); Falconbridge, Conflict
of Laws 473-74 (2d ed. 1954).
11. Marthinson v. Patterson, 20 Ont. 720 (Q.B. 1891), modifying 20 Ont. 125 (App.
Div.), rev'd on other grounds, 19 Ont. A.R. 188 (1892) (chattel mortgage). See also River
Stave Co. v. Sill, 12 Ont. 557 (1886).
12. See supra note 1.
13. Montreal Trust Co. v. Abitibi Power & Paper Co. [1937] Ont. 939, [1937] 4
D.L.R. 369.
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CANADIAN CHATTEL SECURITY LAW
Except for the section 88 security device available to chartered banks,14
the floating charge, and Quebec's law, Canada's chattel security law bears a
striking resemblance to the law of the United States prior to the advent of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Notwithstanding the common heritage of the two
countries, however, the apparent similarities frequently lie only on the surface
because of fundamental differences arising from the constitutional division of
powers,' 5 the federal and provincial statutes, judicial decisions, political and
economic influences, the development of financing methods, the reception of
British law into Canada's matrix in certain instances, as well as many other
factors. An American attorney will therefore discover without surprise or
regret, but perhaps with some nostalgia, the conspicuous absence of counter-
parts to such old favorites as Benedict v. Ratner,16 Moore v. Bay,17 Corn
Exchange National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder,'8 United States v.
R. F. Ball Construction Co.,19 etc. On the other hand, many of the problems
which have engaged the attention of legal commentators in Canada are similar
to those encountered in the United States, for example, the effect of recordation
or filing on the interests of third parties;20 the extent to which an assignee
finance company is free from the defenses of the buyer; 21 the rights of condi-
14. Bank Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 12 (1952), as amended, [1966-67] Can. Stat. c. 87
(1967). Compared to the rest of the Canadian security agreements, the section 88 security
agreement is the essence of simplicity and flexibility, within its functional limitations, and
was no doubt the envy of American financiers prior to the Uniform Trust Receipts Act,
9C Uniform Laws Ann. 220 (1966), since it provides for a floating specific lien (not to be
confused with the floating charge discussed later) and is perfected by notice filing. Even
today some American financing executives are of the opinion this device is superior in some
respects to the floating lien of the Uniform Commercial Code. Interview with John M.
Walbridge, Ass't Vice-Pres., First Nat'l City Bank, New York, June, 1967. For example,
there is strong opinion that UCC § 9-108 which provides a state law rule on what con-
stitutes "new value," will be decided by federal law, thereby leaving the floating lien vul-
nerable in some instances under the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (2) (1964).
1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests In Personal Property 362 (1965). Two recent bankruptcy
cases indicate, however, that the federal courts are taking a favorable view of UCC § 9-108.
Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D.Mass. 1967); Matter of Portland Newspaper
Publ., Inc., No. B64-3282, rev'd, 2 CCH Bank. L. Rep. ff 62,357 (D. Ore. 1967).
Occasionally American banks receive the benefit of the Bank Act "by participating in
loans made to Canadian companies by Canadian banks which obtain a pledge of the com-
panies' receivables and inventory under appropriate provisions of the Canadian Bank Act."
Letter from John M. Walbridge, Ass't Vice-Pres., First Nat'l City Bank of New York to
Professor Dellas W. Lee, June 8, 1967.
15. The British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3, §§ 91, 92 (1867).
16. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
17. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
18. 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
19. 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
20. Joanes, Third Party Rights in Goods Subject to Conditional Sale Agreements and
Chattel Mortgages, 1 U.B.C.L. Rev. 23 (1959); La Forest, Filing Under the Conditional
Sales Act: Is It Notice to Subsequent Purchasers?, 36 Can. B. Rev. 387 (1958).
21. Feltham & Feltham, Retail Instalment Sales Financing-Rights of the Assignee-
Identification of the Finance Company With the Dealer To Protect the Buyer, 40 Can. B.
Rev. 461 (1962); Note, Prudential Finance Corp. v. Kutcheron et al., 11 McGill L.J. 386
(1965).
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tional vendors of goods later affixed to reality; 22 the removal of the collateral
from one registration district or province to another; 28 the inadequacy of the
law to accommodate inventory financing; 24 and the need for a complete revision
of the law.25
Four chattel security devices are encountered in international commercial
transactions, including corresponding Quebec law. They are the pledge, the
chattel mortgage, the conditional sales agreement, and the floating charge.
Because of the simplicity and comparatively universal similarity of the pledge,
it will not be discussed directly. The pledge is important in international trans-
actions however, and is used, for example, to secure loans to Canadian finance
companies secured by a pledge of notes received by the finance companies from
Canadian citizens, and to secure loans to Canadian corporations and individuals
by a pledge of marketable securities in an American bank's possdssion.
20
A chattel mortgage may be used in a variety of ways: to secure loans to
either corporate or non-corporate borrowers independent of other security
devices; to secure loans to corporations in conjunction with a floating or spe-
cific charge regulated by the Corporation Securities Registration Acts and/or
real property mortgage; or to secure the balance of the purchase prices fol-
lowing an absolute sale with a mortgage back-an alternative to the condi-
tional sales contract. The conditional sales agreement, of course, is used only
to secure the balance owing on goods exported to Canada in those instances
where the seller determines such security is desirable. With regard to exports
it is interesting to note that as a matter of policy FCIA recommends that ex-
porters obtain further protection through the use of a chattel mortgage or con-
ditional sales agreement wherever possible and that in some transactions this
form of additional security may be required, particularly where there is some
question about a buyer's financial strength.2 The floating charge is extremely
22. Fetzer, The Ontario Conditional Sales Act, 17 Can. B. Rev. 583 (1939).
23. Comment, Conflict of Laws, 32 Can. B. Rev. 1174 (1954); Comment, 32 Can. B.
Rev. 1181 (1954); Comment, 34 Can. B. Rev. 323 (1956); Note, Conditional Sales and the
Conflict of Laws, 1 U.B.C.L. Rev. 297 (1960).
24. Feltham, New Developments in Security on Inventory (A Personal Property Se-
curity Act), 15 U.N.B.L.J. 1 (1965); Ziegel, The Legal Problems of Wholesale Financing
of Durable Goods in Canada, 41 Can. B. Rev. 54 (1963).
25. Briere, La propriete mobiliere et le commerce, 18 Rev. du Bar. 169 (1958); Catz-
man, The Uniform Commercial Code in Canada, 22 Bus. Law. 209 (1966); Chattel Security:
Order Out of Chaos, 7 Can. B.J. 278 (1964); Comtois, Une Nouvelle Ligislation: La Nan-
tissement Commercial, 9 McGill L.J. 261 (1963); Feitham, supra note 24; Goldenberg,
Conditional Sale Agreements, 2 Can. B.J. 309 (1959); Joanes, supra note 20; Le Dain,
Security Upon Moveable Property in the Province of Quebec, 2 McGill L.J. 77 (1956);
Symposium on the Draft Ontario Bill on Security in Personal Property, 30 Sask. B. Rev.
203 (1965); Ziegel, supra note 24.
26. Interview with, and letter from John M. Walbridge, Ass't Vice-Pres., First Nat'l
City Bank of New York to Professor Dellas W. Lee, June, 1967.
27. Mr. Haskell cites an instance of an American exporter, who had been denied credit
insurance on a particular transaction involving several hundred thousand dollars of machin-
ery and equipment, who used a chattel mortgage to secure the balance of the price. The
Canadian buyer subsequently went into bankruptcy. The exporter's security interest in the
equipment and machinery was protected. Letter from Paul T. Haskell, Vice-Pres., Foreign
Credit Ins. Ass'n, to Professor Dellas W. Lee, July 6, 1967. Eximbank's policy on this point is
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important to international corporate financing since it may be used to charge
a Canadian Corporation's present and future personal property assets, including
accounts receivable, to secure bonds and debentures which in turn are given to
American banks as security for loans28-something which was not possible in
the United States until recently.29
Uniform acts governing the chattel mortgage, conditional sales agreement
and floating charge have been drafted and recommended by the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada.30 These acts have en-
joyed varied success among the common law provinces. Quebec has adopted
none of them.
THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE
Taking inpiration from the laws of New York, Upper Canada adopted its
first chattel mortgage act in 1849,31 and thereafter similar legislation spread
to the other provinces. 32 Today, most of the common law jursidictions have
the Model Bills of Sale Act (hereinafter referred to as the uniform act) as
recommended or with slight modifications. 33 British Columbia and Ontario do
similar to FCIA's. The need for security in addition to credit insurance is determined "after
appraising the credit worthiness of the foreign purchaser. Loans relating to the sale of light
aircraft are more likely to be secured than sales involving other United States Products."
Letter from B. Jenkins Middleton, Vice-Pres., Program Planning and Information, Eximbank
of Washington, D.C., to Professor Dellas W. Lee, July 19, 1967.
28. Letter from John M. Walbridge, Ass't Vice-Pres., First Natl City Bank of New
York, to Professor Dellas W. Lee, June 8, 1967; letter from Thomas J. Devine, Ass't Vice-
Pres., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. of New York, to Professor Dellas W. Lee, June 29,
1967.
29. Coogan and Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on
the Corporate Indenture, 69 Yale L.J. 203, 204 (1959).
30. This organization is the counterpart to the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. The distinction between "model" and "uniform" acts prevailing
in the United States apparently has never been made in Canada in view of the fact that
the avowed purpose of the Canadian Conference is to promote "uniformity" of legislation
in the provinces and that the two terms are used interchangeably. See [1966) Proceedings
of the Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of
Legislation in Canada, Historical Note, 10. All model acts will be referred to as uniform
acts in the text.
31. Compare Mortgages and Sales of Personal Property, [18491 Upper Can. Stat. 2
V.C. 74, §§ 1, 2, with [1833] N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 279, § 1; cf. also The Bills of Sale Act,
17 & 18 Vict. c. 36 (1854) ; and The Bills of Sale Act, 29 & 30 Vict. c. 96 (1865) ; and the
Bills of Sale Act, 41 & 42 Vict. c. 31 (1878); and The Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment
Act, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43 (1882). Some courts were aware of the differences in origin between
the Canadian and the English acts, see Marthinson v. Patterson, 19 Ont. A.R. 188 (1892) ;
Hunt v. Long, 35 Ont. L.R. 502, 27 D.L.R. 337 (1916). New York did not insert a time
period within which registration was required, until 1849.
32. The Bills of Sale Act, Alta Rev. Stat. c. 23 (1955) ; Bills of Sale Act, [19611 B.C.
Stat. c. 6; The Bills of Sale Act, Man. Rev. Stat. c. 17 (1954); Bills of Sale Act, N.B. Rev.
Stat. c. 18 (1952); Bills of Sale Act, [19551 Newf. Stat. bill 22 (1952); Bills of Sale
Ordinance, N.W. Terr. Rev. Ord. c. 7 (1956); Bills of Sale Act, N.S. Rev. Stat. c. 22 (1954)
(as amended 1962); The Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 34
(1960); The Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 392 (1965); The
Bills of Sale Act, P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. 18 (1951) ; Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Or-
dinance, Yuk. Terr. Rev. Ord. c. 9 (1958); Model Bills of Sale Act, Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, Model Acts Recommended from 1918
to 1961 Inclusive, 15 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Model Bills of Sale Act].
33. Reference will be made to the uniform act in lieu of citing to specific provincial
acts where the law is quite similar.
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not have the uniform act but the laws of these provinces, while having their
ideosyncracies, are more or less drawn along the general lines of other chattel
mortgage legislation in North America. 34
A chattel mortgage is a contract which conveys legal title"6 of presently
owned collateral to the mortgagee as security for a debt, with possession of
property remaining in the mortgagor, who has an equitable right to redeem
the property on payment of the debt.3 6 The lien theory which grew up in the
United States3 7 has not been recognized in Canada.
It will be noted that all the Canadian statutes regulating chattel mortgages
contain the phrase "bill of sale'--for the expected reason that these statutes
also regulate sales. Not all sales are governed, however, in that to be subject
to the act a sale must be absolute as opposed to conditional with the goods
being left in the possession of the vendor, thereby creating circumstances
which are potentially deceptive to third parties because of the seller's apparent
continued ownership. In such case the purchaser must file the agreement, thereby
giving public notice of the transaction. If possession of the goods is transferred
to the buyer at the time of sale the transaction falls outside of the act,"" but if
the true intent of the parties is to create a security interest rather than a sale,
compliance is required.3 9 Whether the transaction is one of sale followed by
retention of possession or of mortgage, essentially the same principles are ap-
plicable and frequently the terms "chattel mortgage" and "bill of sale" are
used interchangeably.4"
In theory the chattel mortgage may be used to finance a sale as well as
to secure a loan or other obligation, but in practice the chattel mortgage is
used almost exclusively as a lending device, with the conditional sales contract
occupying the sales field. This is somewhat surprising in view of the flexibility
of the Canadian chattel mortgage. In many respects it appears to be more suit-
34. Ontario has recently enacted legislation, The Personal Property Security Act,
[19671 Ont. Stat. c. 73, which will supersede, inter alia, The Bills of Sale and Chattel
Mortgages Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 34 (1960), and The Conditional Sales Act, Ont.
Rev. Stat. c. 61 (1960). But since Ontario's new act will not become effective in entirety
until Jan. 1, 1972, the old acts will be included in this discussion.
35. Only an equitable interest in future property may be conveyed. Wallace v. Scott,
16 Man. 594, 5 W.L.R. 341 (1907); Coyne v. Lee, 14 Ont. A.R. 503 (1887).
36. O'Brien v. Stebbins, 21 Sask. 478, 3 D.L.R. 274 (1927).
37. 1 L. Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales 4-5 (6th ed. 1953). However,
courts often refer to the interest of a chattel mortgagee as being a "lien" or "charge" on the
goods. See, e.g., Imperial Brewers v. Gelin, 18 Man. L.R. 283 (1908).
38. Heward v. Mitchell, 11 U.C.Q.B. 625 (1853).
39. Baxter v. Friendly Credit Corp., 5 W.W.R. 135, 2 D.L.R. 865 (B.C. 1952); Sexty
v. Agnew, 3 W.W.R. 574, 4 D.LR 587 (Sask 1938); Hope v. Parrott, 7 Ont. L.R. 496
(1904); Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Capital Discount Corp., [1931] Ont. 22, [1931] 1 D.L.R.
1007.
40. In the United States third parties have been protected from reliance on the osten-
sible ownership of a party in possession following an absolute sale on the ground that the
sale was either conclusively fraudulent, see Uniform Sales Act § 25, and Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 2-403. For the rights of subsequent purchasers presumptively fraudulent, see
L. Void, Sales § 80 (2d ed. 1959), and 2 S. Williston, Sales § 349-494 (2d ed. 1948). Of
course a purchaser by way of absolute sale in the United States was always free to use
the recording statutes to protect his interest against third parties if he so desired.
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able to inventory financing than the conditional sales contract. For example,
use of a chattel mortgage to consummate a sale may arise in two ways: as a
mortgage back to the vendor immediately after the execution of a bill of sale,
or as a result of the buyer arranging a loan for the purchase price followed by
a chattel mortgage to the lender. 41 It may secure future advances,42 and after-
acquired property may stand as collateral, 43 providing such property is capable
of adequate description.44 Unrestricted dominion and control over the proceeds,
where the mortgagor is given power of sale, has never been a problem.45 How-
ever, no provision is made for a generalized notice filing system, a continuously
perfected security interest which shifts to the proceeds or new stock arising
after disposition of the old, nor a clear statement of the relative priorities of
conflicting interests in the same collateral.
To be valid, a non-possessory chattel mortgage must be in writing, contain
a "sufficient and full description" of the collateral,46 and the terms of the agree-
ment, including the consideration. 47 It must be signed by the grantor in the
presence of a witness 48 and be accompanied by two affidavits, one by the attest-
ning witness identifying the bill of sale and stating the date of execution, the
other by the grantee, stating the nature and amount of consideration and that
41. For an illustration of parties choosing the wrong document in the latter type of
transaction see Matter of Grand River Motors, Ltd., [1933] Can. S. Ct. 591; 4 D.L.R.
375, 14 Can. Bankr. R. 460.
42. Model Bills of Sale Act § 5; The Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act, Ont.
Rev. Stat. c. 34, § 5 (1960).
43. Model Bills of Sale Act § 3; Bills of Sale Act, [1961) B.C. Stat. c. 6, § 2. It is
interesting to note that Circuit judge Story validated the after-acquired property clause
about twenty years before it received sanction in Great Britain. Mitchell v. Winslow, 17
F. Cas. 527 (No. 9673) (D.C.C. Me. 1843); Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H.L. Cas. 191 (1862);
Lloyd v. European & North Am. Ry., 18 N.B. 194 (1878); cf., Blanchard v. Cooke, 144
Mass. 207, 11 N.E. 83 (1887). For a history of the after-acquired property clause in the
United States see Cohen & Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev.
635 (1939).
44. Model Bills of Sale Act § 4(3); The Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act,
Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 34, § 5 (1960); Fraser v. MacPherson, 34 N.B. 417 (1898).
45. See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) ; Skilton v. Codington, 185 N.Y. 80,
77 N.E. 790 (1906). With respect to accounts receivable, the debtor's dominion and control
over the proceeds has not led to an invalidation of the security agreement but it has had
consequences almost as devastating. For example, an assignment of book debts which
authorized the debtor to "deal with" the proceeds in the ordinary course of business led to a
finding that the agreement was a floating charge and therefore vulnerable to an intervening
garnishment debtor. Great Lakes Petroleum Co. v. Border Cities Oil Ltd., [19341 O.R. 244, 2
D.L.R. 743. Fortunately for financiers the Great Lakes case has been distinguished.
Robinhood Flour Mills Ltd. v. Fuller Bakeries Ltd., 42 W.W.R. 321, 40 D.L.R. 2d
207 (Man. C.A. 1963). A provision that the debtor will hold the proceeds "in trust"
similar to the one in the latter case is found in most assignments of accounts receivable
documents used today.
46. Model Bills of Sale Act § 4(3); cf. The Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act,
Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 34, § 13 (1960).
47. Model Bills of Sale Act, § 6(c). It is important to bear in mind that interest
rates are regulated by federal legislation and that if an interest rate over 5% is to be up-
held, it must always be expressed in terms of the total annual interest rate. Interest Act,
Can. Rev. Stat. c. 156, § 4 (1952); Small Loans Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 251, § 3 (1952);
Buchner, Bonus Mortgages and Unconscionable Transactions, 3 West. Ont. L. Rev. 21 (1964);
see also Bergeron, Des ventes dites conditionnelles, 22 Rev. du Bar. 150 (1962).
48. Model Bills of Sale Act § 8(3); Bills of Sale Act, [1961] B.C. Stat. c. 6, § 4;
The Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 34, § 8 (1960).
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it is justly due or accruing due and not contrived to defeat the grantor's
creditors.
49
A chattel mortgage or bill of sale may be perfected either by the secured
party taking immediate possession of the goods or by filing the agreement as
required by the acts. 0 The rationale for the modes of perfection can be traced
to a principle which arose in an agrarian economy at a time when property
rights meant everything and commercial enterprise comparatively little-nemo
dat quod non habet-one cannot confer on another a better title than he himself
has. In any dispute between an owner or mortgagee and another conflicting
claimant of goods, with the exception of a narrow area of protection afforded
a bona fide purchaser in the ordinary course of business,51 at common law the
owner always prevailed, usually at the expense of a third party who had been
deceived by the debtor's apparent ownership of the goods. It was this situation
the bills of sale legislation was designed to correct.52 Otherwise secret liens
thus become public and open to the scrutiny of all potential creditors, subse-
quent purchasers or mortgagees by virtue of mandatory filing, or registration
requirements as they are more commonly called.53 When a purchaser or mort-
gagee takes possession of the goods at the time of execution, third parties are
not subjected to the same potentially misleading circumstances, and accor-
dingly possession is a recognized mode of perfecting a bill of sale. Of course,
if the real essence of the transaction is a sale rather than security, and the
buyer takes possession of the goods at the time of the sale, nothing further
need be done to protect the purchaser since the sale is absolute in nature and
falls outside of the act.
Suppose, however, that a filing has not been made and possession has not
been taken immediately upon execution, may the mortgagee subsequently per-
fect the agreement by taking possession? The answer is yes, if possession is
49. Model Bills of Sale Act §§ 8(3), 7; Bills of Sale Act, [1961] B.C. Stat. c. 6, §§ 4,
6; The Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 34, §§ 8, 4 (1960).
50. Model Bills of Sale Act §§ 7, 8(3); Bills of Sale Act, [1961] B.C. Stat. c. 6, § 8;
The Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 34, § 8 (1960). British
Columbia requires corporate chattel mortgages to be filed with the Registrar of Companies.
Id. § 9(2)(a), the same place for registering floating and specific corporate charges created
under the Companies Act. Most jurisdictions do not distinguish between corporate and
non-corporate bills of sale for the purpose of registration.
51. Pickering v. Busk, 15 East 38, 104. Eng. Rep. 758 (K.B. 1812).
52. GTP Ry. v. Dearborn, 58 Can. S. Ct. 315, 47 D.L.R. 27 (1919); Jackson v.
Bank of N.S., 9 Man. 378 (1893).
53. Although a distinction was once made to the effect that "filing" referred to the
depositing of a chattel mortgage at the public registry and " registration" to the registrar's
act of recording and indexing the document for the convenience of subsequent searchers,
J. Barron & A. O'Brien, Chattel Mortgages and Bills of Sale 33-34 (3d ed. 1927), the terms
will be used interchangeably since this distinction appears to have been lost. The place of
registration is usually in the registration district where the chattels are situated at the
date of the execution of the bill of sale. Model Bills of Sale Act § 8; The Bills of Sale and
Chattel Mortgages Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 34, § 21 (1960). Some provinces provide for cen-
tral registration. The Chattel Securities Registration Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 23, § 6 (1955)
(as amended 1966) ; Bills of Sale Act, [1961] B.C. Stat. c. 6, § 9; Bills of Sale Act 1955,
Newf. Rev. Stat. 22, § 7 (1952) ; The Bills of Sale Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 392, § 6 ?1965).
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taken before creditors, purchasers or other mortgagees intervene.54 Even if a
mortgage is invalid by virtue of a defect, or failure to file or failure to renew,
the mortgagee may be able to perfect or "cure" by taking possession before
third parties intervene.P5 However, there appears to be some difference of
opinion56 on this latter point.
Filing must be effected within thirty days of execution in those provinces
having the Uniform Act,5" within twenty-one days in British Columbia,5 8 and
either five or ten days, depending on the county, in Ontario.59 It is apparent
that failure to register within the prescribed time will result in the nullity of
the mortgage as against certain intervening third parties,60 and if the time for
registration has passed, it may be necessary to obtain a court order permitting
late registration,6 ' which, if permitted at all, will be subject to accrued rights. 2
However, even in the case of timely registration the rights of the mortgagor as
against intervening third parties are not quite so apparent. To reverse the ques-
tion, what are the rights of creditors, purchasers and mortgagors arising between
execution and the time allotted for registration, i.e., will timely registration
have a relation back effect? A specific answer is not provided by the acts and
a reading of them might lead to the conclusion that in any event the results
would not be uniform. For example, in most of the provinces the mortgage
"takes effect" only from the time of registration. 63 British Columbia nullifies
the mortgage only "after the expiration of the time limited . . . for registra-
tion,"0 4 and Ontario merely requires registration within the time stipulated,
"otherwise the sale is absolutely null and void... .,65 What case law is available
54. Model Bills of Sale Act § 14; Bills of Sale Act, [1961] B.C. Stat. c. 6, § 16; The
Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 34, § 27 (1960); Young v.
Magee, 20 Alta. 431, [19241 3 D.L.R. 426; Adams v. Hutchings (No. 2), 3 Terr. L.R. 206
(1893).
55. Sutton v. Smith, 38 B.C. 455, [19273 3 D.L.R. 1008; Leishman & Co. v. Barker,
10 W.W.R. 209 (Alta. 1916); Brackman v. McLaughlin, 3 B.C. 265 (1894); Robbins v.
Clark, 45 U.C.Q.B. 362 (1880).
56. Matter of Gilbert, [1963] 1 Ont. 455, 37 D.L.R.2d 578; Heaton v. ,Flood, 29 Ont.
87 (1897); Trusts & Loan Co. v. Wright, 11 Man. 314 (1895); Clarkson v. McMaster &
Co., 25 Can. S. Ct. 96 (1895); Young v. Short, 3 Man. 302 (1885); Barker v. Leeson,
1 Ont. 114 (1882).
57. Model Bills of Sale Act § 8(1).
58. Bills of Sale Act, [1961] B.C. Stat. c. 6, § 10(a).
59. The Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 34, §§ 21(3), (4)
(1960).
60. The protected class of third parties is either all or certain creditors, subsequent
purchasers and mortgagees. Model Bills of Sale Act, §§ 4(1), (2) ; Bills of Sale Act, [1961]
B.C. Stat. c. 6, § 16(1); The Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act, Ont. Rev. Stat.
c. 34, § 8 (1960).
61. Model Bills of Sale Act § 21(1) ; cf. The Bills of Sale Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 392,
§ 25 (1965) (No court order is required.).
62. Model Bills of Sale Act § 22.
63. Id. § 4(2).
64. Bills of Sale Act, [1961] B.C. Stat. c. 6, § 16(1).
65. The Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 34, § 8 (1960).
But note that the mortgage "takes effect" upon execution. Id. § 12.
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indicates intervening third parties are likely to prevail over the chattel mortgagee
in most jurisdictions. 6
As was characteristic of chattel mortgage legislation in the United States,
Canadian statutes make no comprehensive provision for resolving priority prob-
lems where conflicting claims are made to the same collateral. It has been neces-
sary for the courts to reason from a number of terse provisions which reveal
little legislative forethought. Where perfection is accomplished through pos-
session, the relative priorities are easily determined since, subject to what has
been said regarding delays, possession is generally recognized both in civil and
common law to give the highest protection available to the holder. But filing,
being a non-possessory method of perfection, by its very nature permits an
infinite number of hidden conflicting interests to arise with the possibility that
equities might weigh more heavily in favor of some claimant other than the
perfected party and, of course, it is possible that more than one party might
hold a perfected interest in the same collateral. Only a few of the problems will
be suggested here.
The acts simply state that unless a bill of sale is registered as required,
it is void "as against a creditor and as against a subsequent purchaser or mort-
gagee who claims from or under the grantor or mortgagee in good faith, for
valuable consideration, and without notice . . . ,,,17 leaving the implication,
and it will be seen later, in some instances, only an implication, that timely
filing will protect the grantee against third parties mentioned. In resolving any
priority problem it is important to have the nemo dat principle in mind at the
outset since only those persons specifically mentioned are permitted to have the
protection of the acts.
Clearly, a perfected chattel mortgage takes priority over a general creditor.
But even where the chattel mortgage is unperfected there remains the question of
whether the challenging party falls within the contemplated creditor ambit.0 8
The majority of jurisdictions require the creditor to have crystalized his rights
by judicial process; 69 others permit a simple contract creditor to prevail.70 A
66. Consol. Fin. Co. v. Alfke, 31 W.W.R. (n.s.) 497 (Alta. 1960). This is an im-
portant case because it is the only one that has construed the phrase "takes effect" found
in the uniform act. Model Bills of Sale Act § 4(2). Cf. Matter of Union Accept. Corp., 16
W.W.R. (n.s.) 283, [1955) 4 DL.R. 822 (Alta.) (Quaere: Whether the result would have
been the same if the sale had been in the ordinary course of business?) Ontario has stood
quite firmly against relation back. Haight v. McInnis, 11 U.C.C.P. 518 (1862); Feehan v.
Bank of Toronto, 10 U.C.C.P. 32 (1860). But see Feehan v. Bank of Toronto, 19 U.C.Q.B.
474 (1860). Compare the approach taken in the case of conditional sales agreements in ra
note 127.
67. Model Bills of Sale Act § 4(1) and cf. Bills of Sale Act, [1961] B.C. Stat. c. 6,
§ 16(1) ; The Bills of Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 34, § 8 (1960).
68. Matter of Lautenschlager, [19343 Ont. 507, [19341 3 D.L.R. 513 (1934); Matter
of Saunders Alta. Collieries, Ltd., [19251 2 W.W.R. 122, [19251 3 D.L.R. 323 (Alta); Bank
of Montreal v. McWhirter, 17 U.C.C.P. 506 (1867). If a party is in fact a creditor, it
makes no difference whether he existed when the chattel mortgage was executed or that
he arose at a subsequent time. Brackman v. McLaughlin, 3 B.C. 265 (1894); ef. Gault Bros.,
Ltd. v. Winter, 49 Can. S. Ct. 541, 19 D.L.R. 281 (1914).
69. E.g., Bills of Sale Act, [19611 B.C. Stat. c. 6, § 16(1) (1960) ; Richards & Brown,
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trustee in bankruptcy is generally permitted to assail the unperfected mortgage
on the ground that he represents the creditors and ought to be able to exercise
their rights.71 There is a division of opinion on whether liquidators come within
the protected class.72
Likewise, it would appear almost too clear for discussion that a perfected
chattel mortgage is valid as against subsequent mortgagees. There are no equi-
ties or commercial necessities which would demand otherwise. Surely it is not
too much to expect a lender, whether in or out of the ordinary course of busi-
ness, to search the filing records before he makes a loan, or to suffer subordi-
nation. The same expectation would exist with regard to all other consensual
liens, such as a subsequent conditional sale7 3 a section 88 security interest,74 and
a floating charge,75 which are all of the same generic class even though not
regulated by the bills of sales legislation. It is a different matter, of course, if
the prior chattel mortgage is not perfected, in which case even a subsequent
unperfected bill of sale may prevail.76
Subsequent purchaser cases may be either of two types: those involving a
chattel mortgage taken to secure a loan or other obligation, by far the most
common, or those where the chattel mortgage has been taken back to secure
the balance of the purchase price following an absolute sale. In the former, the
mercantile agent provisions of the English Factors Act and/or the Sale of Goods
Act7 7 are not applicable, and a subsequent purchaser may not defeat the mort-
gagee unless the mortgagor had express or implied authority to sell the goods.
This may be found, for example, where the mortgagor is a trader or dealer and
the mortgage covers stock in trade which is later sold in the ordinary course
of business to a bona fide purchaser.78
Ltd. v. Leonoff, 25 Man. 548, 8 W.W.R. 966, 24 D.L.R. 180 (1915); Jackson v. Bank of
N.S., 9 Man. 75 (1893); Parkes v. St. George, 10 Ont. A.R. 496 (1884).
70. Boyce v. Royal Bank, [1958] Ont. W.N. 273; Lapierre v. Twin City Gravel Etc.
Co., [1926] 3 W.W.R. 775, 1927 1 D.L.R. 641 (Alta. 1927); contra, Security Trust Co. v.
Stewart, 12 Alta. 420, 39 D.L.R. 518; [1918] 1 W.W.R. 709.
71. Eastern Trust Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., ex rel Morse, 5 Can. Bankr. R. 113
(N.S. 1924); Fitzgerald v. McMorrow, 52 Ont. L.R. 383, [1922] 4 D.L.R. 619; Houlding v.
Can. Credit Men's Trust Ass'n, 14 Sask. 356, 60 D.L.R. 533 (1921); Vassie v. Vassie, 22
N.B. 76 (1882); contra, Tallman v. Smart, 25 Ont. 661 (1894).
72. Bills of Sale Act, [1961] B.C. Stat. c. 6, § 16(1); Matter of Crossen Metal Works,
Ltd., 30 Man. 503, 53 D.L.R. 341 (1920); Matter of Can. Camera & Optical Co. & A. R.
Williams Co's Claim, 2 Ont. L.R. 677 (1901); contra, Security Trust Co. v. Stewart, 12
Alta. 420, 39 D.L.R. 518 (1918); Matter of Can. Shipbldg. Co., 26 Ont. L.R. 564, 6 D.L.R.
174 (1912); Harrison v. Nepisiguit Lumber Co., 41 N.B. 1 (1911).
73. Matter of Jull & Ind. Accept. Corp., 38 W.W.R. 174 (Alta 1962); but compare
U.C.C. § 9-306(5) (a).
74. Guimond v. Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co., 47 Can. S. Ct. 216, 9 D.L.R. 463 (1912).
75. McKay v. J. A. Larocque, [1927] Can. S. Ct. 374, [1927] 2 D.L.R. 1150.
76. Berger v. Myles, [1963] 1 Ont. 525, 38 D.L.R2d 16; Topham v. Motor Securities
Co., 40 B.C. 375, [1928] 1 D.L.R. 995; Poitras v. Pelletier, 38 N.B. 63 (1907); Winn v.
Snider, 26 Ont. A.R. 384 (1899); Marthinson v. Patterson, 19 Ont. A.R. 188 (1892).
77. 52 & 53 Vict. c. 45, §§ 2(1), 9 (1889), quoted infra note 144; 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71,
§§ 25(2), (3) (1892), quoted infra note 145. References in the text are to the provisions
of the English acts unless otherwise indicated.
78. Matter of Indus. Accept. Corp. & Serv. Garage, Ltd. & Thomas, [1933] 2 D.L.R.
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Where the mortgage has been used to secure the balance of the purchase
price, the problem is a little more complex. In this instance it becomes necessary
to consider the impact of counterpart legislation to the Factors Act and/or Sale
of Goods Act in those provinces which have one or both of the statutes as they
relate to the registration philosophy of the bills of sales acts. Is filing notice
under these acts, and if so, what is its bearing on the rights of subsequent
purchasers? Does it make a difference whether the purchase was "in" or "out"
of the ordinary course of business? Since these questions are most frequently
encountered in connection with a conditional sales contract they will be dealt
with later under that heading70 Before leaving the subject a few further obser-
vations will be made to lay a foundation for future discussion.
Five jurisdictions have the relevant provisions of both the Factors Act and
the Sale of Goods Act;80 five have the relevant provision of the Sale of Goods
Act, but not the Factors Act; 81 and Prince Edward Island has only the Factors
Act.8 2 The significant provisions are the counterparts to section 9 of the Factors
Act and section 25(2) of the Sale of Goods Act. In essence these sections pro-
vide that a person who has agreed to buy goods and who has taken possession
of them or a document of title with consent of the seller, can transfer to a
purchaser, pledgee, or one taking by some other mode of disposition in good
faith and without notice, as good a title as if the transferor had been a mer-
cantile agent in possession of the goods or document of title with consent of
the owner.
The Sale of Goods Act contains an excluding provision which states as
follows:
The provisions of the Act relating to contracts of sale do not apply to
any transaction in the form of a contract of sale which is intended to
operate by way of mortgage, pledge, charge, or other security.83
It has been thought that this provision would not exclude the application of
the mercantile agent provisions of the Sale of Goods Act to conditional sales,8 4
and since an absolute sale followed by a mortgage back is of the same nature,
798, [1933] 1 W.W.R. 24 (Alta.); cf. Nourse v. Can. Canners, Ltd., [1935] Ont. 361, [1935]
3 D.L.R. 168; Walker v. Clay, 49 L.J..C. 560 (1880).
79. See text at infra note 143.
80. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 106, § 10(l), and c. 295, § 27(2) (1955); N.B. Rev. Stat. c. 79,§ 12, and c. 199, § 24(2) (1952); N.W. Terr. Rev. Ord. c. 33, § 10, and c. 84, § 25(2)
(1956); Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 351, § 10, and c. 353, § 26(2) (1953); [1954] Yuk. Terr. Ord.
c. 25, § 10, and c. 22, § 25(2). See infra notes 144-45, for the English acts after which
the provincial counterpart acts are patterned.
81. B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 344, § 31(2) (1960); Man. Rev. Stat. c. 233, § 282(2) (1954);
Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 222, § 26(2) (1952); N.S. Rev Stat c. 256, § 27(2) (1954); Ont. Rev.
Stat. c. 358, § 25(2) (1960).
82. P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. 55, § 10(1) (1951).
83. 56 & 57 Vict., § 61(4) (1893) ; Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 295, § 59(3) (1955) ; B.C. Rev.
Stat. c. 344, § 73(3) (1960) ; Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 222, § 59(3) (1952).
84. La Forrest, Filing Under the Conditional Sales Act: Is It Notice to Subsequent
Purchasers?, 36 Can. B. Rev. 387, 398-99; see also Joanes, Third Party Rights in Goods
Subject to Conditional Sale Agreements and Chattel Mortgages, 1 U.B.C.L. Rev. 23, 34
(1959).
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there would seem to be no reason for taking a different view in this case. No
doubt the provision was intended to apply to a transaction intended as security
cloaked as a sale, and not to a bona fide sale, whether or not the price is secured
by a mortgage on the goods. There is no similar exclusionary provision in the
Factors Act.
Remedies of the mortgagee are determined largely by the terms of the
agreement and the common law, although there is a considerable body of
regulatory legislation relative to seizure and sale.85 If the agreement permits,
the mortgagee may take possession of the goods whenever he deems himself
insecure, notwithstanding the fact that there has not yet been a default. More-
over, he may demand payment of the entire balance, again, if the agreement so
provides.8" In the absence of such a provision the mortgagee may not take
possession until the mortgagor is in default, which may occur on failure to pay,
removal of goods from the registration district without the mortgagee's consent,
bankruptcy of the mortgagor, attachment of the goods by third parties, etc.
Upon default the mortgagee may then, providing the agreement permits, enter
the debtor's premises and peaceably seize the goods and sell them either by
private or public auction. 87 In exercising this remedy the mortgagor must comply
with any laws governing seizure,88 and the subsequnt sale must be executed
in a reasonable and prudent manner. 89 Deficiency actions may be permitted.90
An action on the covenant for the debt is an alternative remedy which may be
exercised only if the mortgagee is able to return the goods upon payment of the
debt 91 Foreclosure is always another alternative remedy, but because it is
slow and requires court action it is seldom sought
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THE CONDITIONAL SALE
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act was promulgated by the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada in 1922, following
which the act received various amendments and underwent revisions in 1947
and again in 1955. The uniform act has been adopted, as recommended or with
slight modifications, by New Brunswick, the North West Territories, Nova
Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and the Yukon Territory.98 British Columbia
85. E.g., The Seizures Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 307 (1955).
86. Meincke v. City Dairy, Ltd. (No. 2), 40 Man. 465, [1932] 2 W.W.R. 398; Westa-
way v. Stewart, 2 Sask. 178, 10 West. L.R. 623 (1909).
87. Cf. Gladman v. Hothersall, [1936] Ont. W.N. 358.
88. Rudder v. Lundin, 18 Alta. 227, 67 D.L.R. 657 (1922); Tinant v. Simon, 67
D.L.R. 773 (Sask. 1921); The Seizures Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 307 (1955).
89. J. & W. Inv., Ltd. v. Black, 38 D.L.R.2d 251, 41 W.W.R. 577 (B.C. 1963); Bay
Motors Co. v. Traders Fin. Corp., 19 D.L.R.2d 331 (N.B. 1959).
90. Severn v. Clarke, 30 U.C.C.P. 363 (1879); contra Silk Hat Restaurant, Ltd. v.
Bellman, 22 D.L.R.2d 317, 30 W.W.R. (ns.) 97 (Alta. 1959).
91 Stephen v. Black, [1902] Cout. Dig. 217 (Can. S. Ct. 1902); Parkinson v. Higgins,
37 U.C.Q.B. 308, aff'd, 40 U.C.Q.B. 274 (1875).
92. Krook v. Yewchuk, [1962] Can. S. Ct. 535, 34 D.L.R.2d 676, 39 W.W.R. 13;
Rennick v. Bender, 18 Sask. 34, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 739.
93. Conditional Sales Act, N.B. Rev. Stat. c. 34 (1952); Conditional Sales Act, N.S.
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adopted the act in 1922 but later repealed it. However, British Columbia,
Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland have many provisions patterned after the
uniform actY4 Ontario's act is somewhat different, but Manitoba's act is a vast
departure from the usual scheme of conditional sales legislation."
Nothwithstanding the comparatively poor reception given to the uniform
act, all the common law provinces provide for the creation of a valid conditional
sale wherein the seller retains title to the goods sold, with possession being
delivered to the buyer who ultimately may acquire title by paying the price
or performing some other condition. a0 If the buyer fails to perform according
to the terms of the contract the seller may "repossess" the goods and in some
provinces exercise further rights against the buyer, as will be discussed later.
The development of an independent but related form of security device, the
hire purchase agreement, prevalant in England where the courts still fail to
look through form to substance, 7 has been restrained in Canada by virtue of the
fact that under the uniform act,98 as well as most of the other acts, 9 a condi-
tional sale includes a hire purchase agreement by definition. Although both de-
vices are thereby authorized, identical functional limitations, formal requisites,
and methods of perfection, lead to the conclusion that the difference between
the two devices in Canada is primarily academic.
The observation made earlier that although the chattel mortgage could be
used, and in several respects is more flexible, the conditional sales contract is
the device commonly employed to finance inventory and retail sales. The financ-
ing of hard goods at the inventory level is very similar to the methods sometimes
followed in the United States during its trust receipt and conditional sales
era.'00 However, there is only one section in the acts which suggests that the
draftsmen thought the conditional sales agreement would be used in this manner
and this is the so-called "traders" provision, the counterpart to section 9 of the
American Uniform Conditional Sales Act, which permits a buyer in the ordinary
course of trade to cut off the inventory financer's interest under certain condi-
tions.' 0 ' Similar to the chattel mortgage acts, no provision is made for notice
Rev. Stat. c. 47 (1954); Conditional Sales Ordinance, NV. Terr. Rev. Ord. c. 15 (1956);
The Conditional Sales Act, P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. 28 (1951); Conditional Sales Ordinance,
Yuk. Terr. Rev. Ord. c. 20 (1958); Model Conditional Sales Act, Model Acts Recommended
from 1918 to 1961 Inclusive, Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in
Canada, 45 (1962) [hereinafter cited Model Conditional Sales Act].
94. Conditional Sales Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70 (1960); The Conditional Sales Act,
Newf. Rev. Stat. bill 62 (1952); The Conditional Sales Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393 (1965).
95. The Lien Notes Act, Man. Rev. Stat. c. 144 (1954); The Conditional Sales Act,
Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61 (1960).
96. Model Conditional Sales Act § 2(f); Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 3(1) (1955).
97. Atiyah, Injustices and Anomalies in the Law of Hire Purchase, 5 Bus. L. Rev. 24
(1958).
98. Model Conditional Sales Act § 2(f).
99. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 3(1) (1955); B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 2 (1960) ; Ont.
Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 1 (1960); Sask. Rev. Stat c. 393, § 2(f) (1965).
100. Kripke, Inventory Financing of Hard Goods, 74 Banking L.J. 1013, 1016-17
(1957).
101. Model Conditional Sales Act § 9.
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filing or a continuously perfected security interest in proceeds derived from
disposition of the collateral. In contrast to the chattel mortgage acts no pro-
vision is made for after acquired property and future advance clauses.1 2 The
Uniform Trust Receipts Act came to the rescue of inventory financing in the
United States, but nothing of a comparable nature has been developed in
Canada, outside of the validation of certain types of financing available to
chartered banks.10 3
Although the provinces are unanimous only in their requirement that the
agreement must be in writing and signed by the buyer, 0 4 there is substantial
agreement in regard to other formal requisites. Most of the provinces require a
description by which the goods may be "readily and easily known and dis-
tinguished," and in some provinces the serial number of automobiles is re-
quired, 1 5 although Saskatchewan requires the serial number of all goods that
have one.10 Ontario merely requires a statement "describing the goods sold
or lent for hire."' 0 7 A statement of the "amount of the purchase price remaining
unpaid and the terms and conditions of payment" are required by all provinces
having the uniform act as well as by Alberta and Saskatchewan. 0 8 British
Columbia requires only that the unpaid balance of the purchase price or the
terms and conditions of the hiring be set forth. Ontario has a more comprehen-
sive requirement-that the "terms and conditions of the sale"'1 9 must be set
forth. The uniform act and the acts of two other provinces stipulate that the
time of execution must be "prior to, at the time of or within 10 days after
delivery; "110 while Alberta merely requires registration to be within thirty days
of delivery."' Ontario also stipulates no time for execution but requires regis-
tration to be within ten days thereof.".2 Affidavits of bona fides by sellers are no
longer required except in conjunction with renewal statements in those provinces
which require renewal, 1 13 and in the case of goods to be affixed to land in some
102. Brown & Murray, Ltd. v. North Star Oil, Ltd., 33 W.W.R. 49 (Man. 1960) (An
attempt to include future goods under a conditional sale agreement was held to be in the
nature of a secret lien and invalid for want of compliance with the Bills of Sale Act).
103. For an account of the unsuccessful attempts to institute the use of unregistered
trust receipts in Canada see, Mandell, Trust Receipt Financing, 19 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev.
127 (1961).
104. Model Conditional Sales Act § 4(1); Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 3(1) (1955); B.C.
Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 3(2) (1960) ; Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 21(1) (a) (1960) ; Sask. Rev. Stat.
c. 393, § 5(1) (1965).
105. Model Conditional Sales Act H9 4(1), 5(3); Alta .Rev. Stat. c. 54, §§ 3(2), 5(2)
(1955); B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 3 (1960).
106. Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 5(1) (1965).
107. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(1)(a) (1960).
108. Model Conditional Sales Act § 4(1)(b); Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 4(3) (1955);
Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 5(1) (1965).
109. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(1) (a) (1960).
110. Model Conditional Sales Act § 4(1); B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 3(2) (1960); Sask.
Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 5(1) (1965).
111. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 3(1) (1955).
112. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(1)(b) (1960).
113. Model Conditional Sales Act, § 12(2)(b); Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 7(2) (1955);
B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 7(b) (1960) ; Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 5(2) (1960) ; Sask. Rev. Stat.
c. 393, § 13(2)(b) (1965).
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provinces. 14 However, Saskatchewan, following the discard of its affidavit re-
quirement, inserted a provision nullifying conditional sales agreements as
against creditors and subsequent purchasers of the buyer. In the event parties
inadvertantly fail to comply with the formal requisites, or if other errors or
omissions arise, they may be corrected by court order subject to accrued
rights," 5 and in all provinces except Alberta and Ontario complaining parties
must show they have been actually misled by the irregularity.1 0 As was often
the case in the United States, the courts have been extremely conservative in
dealing with these requirenmts, thereby manifesting tacit hostility to secured
creditors.1 7
Registration or filing is the most widely used system for perfecting a con-
ditional sale. However, in the case of manufactured goods, several provinces have
perpetuated a novel method which contemplates little more than marking the
goods with the seller's name. Taking possession is not generally considered a
method of perfecting a conditional sale and some provinces specifically provide
that taking possession will not validate an unregistered conditional sale as
against third parties whose rights have arisen during the interim." 8 The implica-
tion remains, however, that taking possession would protect the seller against
parties whose rights arise thereafter."19 In Ontario perfection is possible by
attachment, in effect, in the case of "household furniture other than pianos,
organs and other musical instruments .... ,12D
Typically the acts provide that where a sale has been made reserving title
to the goods in the seller with possession delivered to the buyer, the agreement
or a true copy must be filed or registered in a particular place,' 12 within a
specified time. Thirty days from exceution in the most common period permitted
for registration. 1 22 British Columbia allows twenty-one days128 and Ontario ten
days.12 4 As noted earlier, most of the provinces permit execution to take place
114. B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 12(5) (1960); Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 14(2) (1960);
Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 19(6) (1965).
115. Model Conditional Sales Act § 19; Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 13 (1955); B.C. Rev.
Stat. c. 70, § 16 (1960); Newf. Rev. Stat. bill 62, § 18 (1952).
116. Model Conditional Sales Act § 20; B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 16 (1960); Newf.
Rev. Stat. bill 62, § 19 (1952) ; Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 25 (1965).
117. Matter of H.H. Kerr Motors, Ltd. & De Long, [1920J 3 W.W.R. 245 (Alta.);
Theatre Amusement Co. v. Squires, 11 Sask. 411, 43 D.L.R. 496 (1918); cf. Pantelechuk v.
Johnson, 30 W.W.R. 673, 21 D.L.R.2d 752 (Alta. 1959).
118. B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 15 (1960).
119. Matter of Cataract Elec. Co., 5 Can. Bankr. R. 612 (Ont. 1925); cf. Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Klebeck, 42 D.L.R.2d 760 (Sask. 1963).
120. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(5) (1960).
121. The most frequently specified place is the registration district where the buyer
resides at the time of the sale. Model Conditional Sales Act § 2(2); Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61,
§ 2(1)(b) (1960). Four provinces have central filing systems. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 12, § 3
(1955); B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, §§ 4, 6 (1960); Newf. Rev. Stat. bill 62, § 4(2) (1952);
Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 5(2) (1965).
122. Model Act § 2(2); Newf. Rev. Stat. bill 62, § 4(2) (1952); Sask. Rev. Stat.
c. 393, § 5(4) (1965).
123. B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, §§ 4, 6 (1960).
124. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(1) (b) (1960). It would appear that since Ontario's
time runs from execution as opposed to delivery, the time could be postponed indefinitely,
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up to ten days after delivery, thereby implying that the vendor will be protected
against intervening third parties during this period. Add to this the twenty-one
days in British Columbia and the thirty days in most of the other provinces
allowed for registration and we have the unusually long period of thirty-one to
forty days during which a valid secret lien may be in existence.125
This raises the question whether the time allowed for registration is a true
grace period with a relation back effect of the type encountered in some of the
United States120 or merely an expression of policy that in no event will a con-
ditional vendor be protected against third parties unless the agreement is filed
within the specified time, leaving open the question whether intervening third
parties may prevail notwithstanding timely filing. Does it make a difference
if the registration is late, or if the third party intervenes after the time for
filing but before registration is effected? Since some of the provinces have
legislation modeled after the English Factors Act and the Sale of Goods Act,
any discussion of these questions with regard to the rights of purchasers will be
qualified by those acts to the extent they are applicable and also by the rules
of estoppel and agency. They will be discussed later in connection with the
subject of priorities.
Although the acts imply that timely registration will protect vendors
against intervening third parties, considerable doubt has been expressed on
this point.'2 7 This is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that before the
conditional sales acts were adopted the common law passionately protected the
owner's rights under the nemo dat rule. Superimpose on this a conditional sales
statute which only purports to protect the rights of certain third parties unless
a conditional sales agreement is registered within a specified time and the in-
escapable conclusion is, irrespective of its commercial desireability, that timely
thereby validating a perpetual secret lien. Reading Ontario's provision in id. §§ 2(1) (a), (b)
conjunctively, as it should be read, would lead to the conclusion (Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54,
§ 3(1) (1955) looks similar in this respect) that the conditional sales agreement is invalid
as against any of the intervening third parties mentioned unless the agreement is executed
prior to their intervention and then, providing registration is within 10 days following
execution (30 days from delivery in Alberta) the vendor would prevail. So far as Ontario
is concerned, this still does not set any mandatbry time within which execution must be
accomplished, but as a practical matter the fear of intervening third parties arising prior to
execution but after change of possession would no doubt be sufficient motivation to compel
execution before or shortly after delivery in most instances. Thus the difference in wording
between the acts on this point would be of little significance in practice.
125. The third parties generally described are subsequent purchasers or mortgagees in
good faith and for valuable consideration, and creditors of the buyer. Model Conditional
Sales Act § 3; Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(1) (1960). Alberta: Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 3(1955), and British Columbia: B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 15 (1960) require the creditors to
have risen to the level of judgment or execution creditors or, in the case of British Colum-
bia, to be represented by a trustee in bankruptcy.
126. Fleschner v. Sumpter, 12 Ore. 161, 6 Pac. 506 (1885); Soude v. Morrow, 33 Pa.
St. 83 (1859).
127. Indus. Accept. Corp. v. Munro, [1950) Ont. W.N. 220, [1950] 3 DJ..R. 80.
"Subsequent purchaser" was construed to include any purchaser, not just those arising after
the expiration of the period prescribed for timely filing. Although filing was not within the
ten day period as required, the reasons given for the decision indicate timely filing would
have made no difference,
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registration will preserve to the conditional vendor his common lav rights
against these parties, 28 except to the extent to which they are nullified by the
provisions of the same or other statutes or judicial decisions. Accordingly, a
comparatively recent Alberta case held that timely registration will protect the
conditional vendor against an intervening purchaser. 29
The uniform act permits an extension of time for registration where failure
to file is due to inadvertance, but this is "subject to the rights of other persons
accrued by reason of the omission. . .. ,,130 Surely, only rights arising after the
date for timely registration could be said to have arisen "by reason of the
omission" to register in time, meaning that third parties arising before the ex-
piration of the registration period would not prevail over the conditional vendor.
British Columbia and Saskatchewan make no express or implied distinction be-
tween the rights of third parties arising before and after the period for timely
registration' 31 so that the vendor's rights would be preserved under the nemo
dat rule. Ontario expressly provides that the vendor's interests will be valid
as against third parties "only from the actual date of registration." 3 2 In all
provinces except Alberta and Ontario, however, intervening third parties will
prevail against the conditional vendor unless they were actually misled by the
late registration. 33
Several provinces exempt certain sellers of manufactured goods from reg-
istering a conditional sale agreement where the name of the seller is plainly
affixed to the goods and the seller maintains an office in the province at which
further information regarding ownership of the goods may be obtained .13 Alberta
128. Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Stratford, 47 Ont. L.R. 392 (1920). The court indicates
that filing puts the conditional vendor in the same position he would have been in if tile
Act had not been passed. See also Commercial Equip. Rentals, Ltd. v. Can. Fairbanks-
Morse Co., 42 W.W.R. 177 (Alta. 1963).
129. Klimove v. GMAC, 14 W.W.R. 463, 2 D.L.R. 215 (Alta. 1955). This case was
distinguished in a case involving a chattel mortgage on the ground that under the Act the
mortgage did not "take effect" until registration, and that no similar phrase was in the
Conditional Sales Act. Consol. Fin. Co. v. Alfke, 31 W.W.R. (n.s.) 497 (Alta. 1960). The
Klimove case does not specifically indicate whether the vendee was a dealer or trader, but
the fact that the second buyer searched the registry of liens and encumbrances before buy-
ing indicates that he probably was not. In this event the sale would not have been in the
ordinary course of business. Quaere: Whether the result would have been the same if the
sale had been in the ordinary course of business? Whether the "sale" in Indus. Accept. Corp.
v. Munro, [1950] Ont. 130, [1950] 1 D.L.R. 817, [19501 Ont. W.N. 79, was in the ordinary
course of the seller's business is equivocal, but it was said that the "purchase" was in the
ordinary course of business, if such a distinction is possible. Id. at 131, [19501 1 D.L.R. at
818, [1950] Ont. W.N. at 79. That Munro did involve a "sale" in the ordinary course of
business would appear to be the only rational basis for reconciling the decision with the
rest of the law.
130. Model Conditional Sales Act § 19(1); accord, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 13(1) (b)
(1955) ; Newf. Rev. Stat. bill 62, § 18(1) (1952). Note that application to the court is not
necessary for a late registration in Saskatchewan. Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 30 (1965).
131. B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 10(2) (1960); Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 30 (1965).
132. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(7) (1960) ; Indus. Accept. Corp. v. Munro, [1950] Ont.
W.N. 220, [19501 3 D.L.R. 80.
133. Model Conditional Sales Act, § 20; B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 16 (1960); Newf. Rev.
Stat. bill 62, § 19 (1952) ; Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 35 (1965).
134. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, §§ 11, 12 (1955); Man. Rev. Stat. c. 144, § 2 (1954); Newf.
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and Ontario allow this method of perfection for any seller of manufactured
goods. 135 Manitoba and Newfoundland appear to limit marking to manufac-
turers only.136 Manufacturers and wholesalers may mark the goods under
Saskatchewan law, but the transactions in which this is authorized are restricted
to manufactured goods sold "to a buyer for resale who sells such goods in the
ordinary course of his business." 37 Most of the provinces make this system of
perfection optional to registration. However, Manitoba not only has no optional
registration, but, as noted earlier, has no system of registration whatever. Since
none of the provinces requires anything more than the name and address of the
party claiming an interest, i.e., it is not necessary for the inscription to say that
the party is the owner or to give other information, this method of perfection
come perilously close to validating a secret lien.
In sorting out the relative priorities between conditional vendors and sub-
sequent purchasers it is necessary to deal with several statutes which, because
their true intent has been misunderstood, have caused this area of the law to
become unduly complex.' 38 In view of the inclination of legislatures to play
"follow the leader" in adopting legislation, the statutes will be dealt with in the
order they were adopted by the first few provinces on the hypothesis that these
provinces-above all others ultimately to adopt the relevant statutes-would
have considered their purpose and effect on existing law, and that this approach
might permit a rational reconciliation of relevant provisions. The general order
of adoption by most of the jurisdictions was: Conditional Sales Acts, Factors
and/or Sale of Goods Acts, and then a "traders" section was added to most of
the Conditional Sales Acts.139
Rev. Stat. bill 62, § 5(1)(2) (1952) ; Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(5) (1960) (Household furni-
ture other than pianos excluded.).
135. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 11 (1955) ; Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(5) (1960).
136. Man. Rev. Stat. c. 144, § 2 (1954); Newf. Rev. Stat. bill 62, § 5 (1952).
137. Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 5(7) (1965).
138. The rationale which follows would also be applicable to the rights of purchasers
of goods encumbered by a chattel mortgage taken back to secure the balance of the price,
as mentioned earlier. See text at supra note 79.
139. British Columbia: Conditional Sales Act, [1892] B.C. Stat. c. 21; Sale of Goods
Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 169, § 33(2) (1897) ; Traders Section, B.C. Stat. c. 13, § 4 (1922) ;
New Brunswick: Conditional Sales Act, [1899] N.B. Stat. c. 12; Sale of Goods Act, [1919]
N.B. Stat. c. 4, § 25(2); Traders Section, N.B. Rev. Stat. c. 152, § 4 (1927); Nova Scotia:
Conditional Sales Act, [1882] N.S. Stat. c. 13; Factors Act, N.S. Stat. c. 11, § 9 (1895);
Traders Section, [1930] N.S. Stat. c. 6, § 4; Ontario: Conditional Sales Act, [1888] Ont.
Stat. c. 19; The Factors Act, [1910] Ont. Stat. c. 66, § 10(1) ; Traders Section, [1892] Ont.
Stat. c. 26, § 5(2) ; Prince Edward Island: Conditional Sales Act, [1896] P.E.I. Stat. c. 6; Fac-
tors Act, [1919] P.E.I. Stat. c. 11, § 31(b) ; Traders Section, [1934] P.E.I. Stat. c. 3, § 4. Only
in the case of Ontario was the Sale of Goods Act adopted out of the order suggested for
most of the jurisdictions. However, even Ontario's legislative history supports the hy-
pothesis, to be discussed later, that the initially intended effect of the mercantile agent
(sale as if by) provision of the Sale of Goods Act was to allow only purchasers in the
ordinary course of buainess to prevail over the conditional vendor, nothwithstanding regis-
tration. This had already been accomplished in Ontario by virtue of a traders section
instituted in 1892 thereby making the mercantile agent provision of the Sale of Goods Act
unnecessary. Thus, when the Sale of Goods Act was adopted in 1910, a provision was
added rendering the mercantile agent provision inapplicable to all agreements subject to the
Conditional Sales Act. Unfortunately this provision was repealed in [1920) Ont. Stat. c. 40.
Similar provisions exist in Alberta, Manitoba and Prince Edward Island.
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As always, the discussion must begin with the common law nemo dat
principle under which an owner's interest in goods could not be impaired without
his authority or consent except by sales in market overt.140 Accordingly, an
owner who sold goods and transferred possession to the buyer, reserving title
to himself until payment, would prevail over third parties who had subsequently
purchased the goods, even without notice of the owner's interest and notwith-
standing the fact that no reasonable and speedy means existed by which a
purchaser might discover the owner's outstanding interest. To correct this in-
equity, or at least to give subsequent purchasers and other named third parties,
some means of self-protection, conditional sales acts were adopted in most of
the provinces, requiring conditional vendors to file their agreements or suffer
the consequences of invalidity as against various third parties.141 Thus a
failure to file would deprive the owner of his common law rights against sub-
sequent purchasers and, at least at this stage of development, filing would
preserve these rights even against a purchaser in the ordinary course of business,
except to the extent that he obtained protection at common law, which might
be thought to be nill following the enactment of filing statutes. 142
England, having no filing requirements for conditional sales contracts, had
developed a series of Factors Acts, later embodied in the Sale of Goods Act,
to cure the same problem filing had been designed to rectify in Canada. Upon
adoption of counterparts to these acts by Canadian provinces the question arose:
Does filing constitute notice to all, some, or none of the subsequent purchasers?'4 8
If filing were found to constitute notice to all purchasers it would mean in
effect that the legislature had adopted the relevant provisions of the Factors Act
and/or Sale of Goods Act for nothing. On the other hand, if filing failed to
constitute notice, even purchasers out of the ordinary course of business would
prevail over conditional vendors notwithstanding timely filing. In provinces
where Conditional Sales Acts preceded the Sale of Goods Act it could hardly
be expected that the draftsmen of the Conditional Sales Acts would have furn-
ished an answer to this specific question. However, an examination of the
English provisions which were adopted almost verbatim by most of the prov-
inces will give insight to the problem. Section 9 of the Factors Act provides:
Where a person, having bought or agreed to buy goods, obtains with
the consent of the seller possession of the goods or the documents of
title to the goods, the delivery or transfer, by that person or by a mer-
cantile agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title, under
any sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof, or under any agreement
140. Cole v. The North Western Bank, L.R. 10 C.P. 354, 362-63 (1875).
141. Contemporary statutes render a conditional seller's interest void "as against a
creditor, and as against a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee claiming from or under the
buyer in good faith, for valuable consideration, without notice .... " Model Conditional Sales
Act § 3, Newf. Rev. Stat. bill 62, § 3 (1952) ; Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(1) (1960) ; Sask.
Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 3(1) (1965).
142. Cf. Pickering v. Busk, 15 East 38, 104 Eng. Rep. 738 (K.B. 1812).
143. For similar questions relative to the use of a chattel mortgage to secure the
price see text at supra note 79.
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for sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving
the same in good faith and without notice of any lien or other right
of the original seller in respect of the goods, shall have the same effect
as if the person making the delivery or transfer were a mercantile
agent in possession of the goods or documents of title with the consent
of the owner.144
Section 25(2) of the Sale of Goods Act1 45 is identical to section 9 of the
Factors Act except that it omits the phrase "or under an agreement for sale,
pledge or other disposition thereof," which is of no significance to the point
under discussion. To determine the effect of a sale by a mercantile agent section
2(1) of the Factors Act must be examined:
Where a mercantile agent is, with the consent of the owner, in posses-
sion of goods or of the documents of title to goods, any sale, pledge, or
other disposition of the goods, made by him when acting in the ordinary
course of business of a mercantile agent, shall, subject to the provisions
of this Act, be as valid as if authorized by the owner of the goods to
make the same; provided that the person taking under the disposition
acts in good faith, and has not at the time of the disposition notice
that the person making the disposition has not authority to make the
same. [Emphasis added.]
Section 25(3) of the Sale of Goods Act states:
In this section the term "mercantile agent" has the same meaning
as in the Factors Act.
Thus, under the English Acts it was only when a mercantile agent was "acting
in the ordinary course of business.. ." that a subsequent purchaser could even
hope to cut off the rights of a conditional vendor, assuming there had been
legislation in England similar to the Conditional Sales Acts in force in the
provinces. It will be observed that by section 9 of the Factors Act certain
persons other than mercantile agents are, in effect, deemed to be mercantile
agents or to have similar powers in certain circumstances. But it is submitted
that it was never intended that such persons be able to cut off the owner's
rights to goods except where they too sold or acted "in the ordinary course of
business. . . " The English courts themselves have overlooked this qualifica-
tion.146 Any other view would lead to the distinction that purchasers from a
mercantile agent out of the cordinary course of business would be denied the
cut-off protection of the act while such purchasers from a "non-mercantile
agent" would not. Why should purchases from non-mercantile agents be favored
above those buying from a mercantile agent? Surely there is no valid basis for
144. 52 & 53 Vict. c. 45 (1889).
145. 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71 (1893).
146. Lee v. Butler, [1893] 2 Q.B. 318. Although it is admitted that there might have
been some point to this decision since England did not have a filing system to protect buyers
out of the ordinary course of trade, an argument based on the qualification mentioned above
was not made, and the court did not consider the question whether parliament had intended
to go so far intenacting the Factors Act.
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such a distinction and it is unlikely Parliament thought that there was. If the
distinction were eliminated a determination that filing under a Conditional
Sales Act does not constitute notice under relevant provisions of the Factors
Act and Sale of Goods Act would result in the conclusion that only purchasers in
the ordinary course of business would prevail over the conditional vendor who
had properly filed. This is eminently realistic since purchasers out of the ordinary
course of business can be expected to search before buying under today's condi-
tions. 1
47
Alberta, New Brunswick, and probably other provinces have varied the
definition of mercantile agent as follows:
"mercantile agent" means a mercantile agent having, in the customary
course of his business as such agent, authority either to sell goods or to
consign goods for the purpose of sale or to buy goods or to raise money
on the security of goods.1
48
It will be noted that the italicized words differ slightly from those found in the
English acts, but the difference would not appear to require a construction of
the Canadian acts contrary to the English acts on the point under discussion.
In the only two pertinent cases found, the relevant principles here dis-
cussed are dictum. In the first, the court did not place any significance on the
fact that the sale was in the ordinary course of business, but simply on the
view that the doctrine of constructive notice would not deprive the buyer
of the "cut-off" protection of the Sale of Goods Act.1 49 However, it is interesting
to note that the sale was in fact in the ordinary course of business and there
may be some doubt whether the judge would have ruled the same way if it had
not been.'5 0 In the second case, the sale was also in the ordinary course of
business but Sloan J. A., for the majority, stated, "Filing of a conditional sale
agreement may be [by reason of section 2 of the Conditional Sales Act] con-
structive notice to subsequent purchasers or mortgagees claiming from the
buyer .... ,,151 In this case a subsequent purchaser would have been out of the
ordinary course since the conditional vendee was not a dealer. While it cannot
be agreed that subsequent mortgagees ought to be included in the same
category, it is significant that whereas Sloan J. A. was not willing to apply the
doctrine of constructive notice to a sale in the ordinary course, he would have
147. Whether a sale is in the ordinary course of business is, of course, a question of
fact. Nourse v. Can. Canners, Ltd., [1935] Ont. 361; [1935] 2 D.L.R. 121. Sales out of the
ordinary course of business generally would include second hand sales, sales by one dealer to
another where this is not usually done, sales by merchants of other than those things usually
sold by the business, such as a piece of the establishment's equipment. Cf. UCC § 9-307(1).
148. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 106, § 2(l)(c) (1955). (Emphasis added.)
149. Commercial Credit Co. of Can. v. Fulton Bros., 55 N.S. 208, 65 D.L.R. 699
(1922); aff'd on other grounds, [1923] A.C. 798, [1923) 3 D.L.R. 611.
150. An examination of the cases generally reveals that a fairly good case can be
made for the view that the doctrine of constructive notice ought to he ignored only when
transactions are made in the ordinary course of business, or in "commercial transactions"
as they are sometimes called. Waynacht v. McGinty, 12 E.L.R. 116 (1912); Joseph v.
Lyons, L.R. 15 Q.B.D. 280 (1884).
151. Vowles v. Island Fin., Ltd., 55 B.C. 362, 367, [1940] 4 D.L.R. 357, 360.
108
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
been willing to do so to a sale out of the ordinary course of business. This, it is
submitted, is the correct view.152
Most of the provinces presently have a traders provision which appears to
permit approximately what the Factors and Sale of Goods Acts were intended
to accomplish, specifically, that a purchaser in the ordinary course of business
would prevail over a conditional seller even though his interest is perfected by
filing. Perhaps the traders provision was instituted to clarify the confusion that
might otherwise arise from a misconstruction of the relevant provisions of the
Factors Acts and the Sale of Goods Acts. In any event, as a condition to its
applicability, the seller's consent to the sale of the goods in the ordinary course
of trade is usually required, 15 although in Ontario it is not.154 The provisions
do not require a "bona fide" purchaser so that presumably a buyer in the
ordinary course would prevail over the conditional vendor even though he had
notice of a recorded interest, at least so long as he did not have knowledge of
any specific restriction on the conditional vendee's right to sell the goods.
Alberta and Manitoba do not have a traders section and they have excluded
the application of the mercantile agent provisions of the Factors Act and Sale
of Goods Act to transactions complying with the Conditional Sales Act. In
Alberta the rights of purchasers from conditional vendees are governed by the
common law qualified by the impact of the filing system, while in Manitoba the
filing system, which does not exist, need not be considered. Prince Edward
Island does have a traders section' 5 5 but the problem is simplified because ap-
plication of the Factors Act to conditional sales transactions is also excluded.
Thus buyers in the ordinary course of business would take priority over a
conditional seller's perfected interest.
Since the Factors Act and Sale of Goods Act are not relevant except where
goods have been "delivered" to a transferee, the rights of subsequent chattel
mortgagees would remain as they were prior to the enactment of these statutes.
This, as will be recalled, qualifies the nemo dat rule to the extent that unfiled
interests are void. Filed interests, on the other hand, preserve to the conditional
seller the rights he held at common law as against subsequent chattel mortgagees
and, one would expect, as against all other consensual liens of the same generic
nature. Even if it could be conceded that purchasers out of the ordinary course
of business should not be expected to search before buying, it could not be
152. It is interesting to note that this approach has been taken under the chattel mort-
gages acts independent of the Factors Act and Sale of Goods Act. Nourse v. Can. Canners,
Ltd., (19353 Ont. 361, [1935] 3 D.L.R. 168. For two opposing views on the hypothesis
expressed herein see Joanes, Third Party Rights in Goods Subject to Conditional Sale
Agreements and Chattel Mortgages, 1 U.B.C.L. Rev. 23 (1959); and La Forest, Filing Under
The Conditional Sales Act: Is it Notice to Subsequent Purchasers?, 36 Can. B. Rev. 387(1958).
153. Model Conditional Sales Act § 9; B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 18(2) (1960); Newf.
Rev. Stat. bill 62, § 8 (1952) ; Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 10 (1965).
154. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(4) (1960).
155. P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. 28, § 4 (1951).
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conceded that lenders ought not to be expected to search before making a
secured loan.
Creditors are also not within the protected class mentioned in the Factors
Act and the Sale of Goods Act. Accordingly, a filed conditional sales contract
gives the seller priority over creditors in most provinces whether arising before or
after execution,' 56 but in Ontario not even filing is necessary to preserve to the
seller his common law rights, except where the goods have been delivered to a
dealer for resale in the ordinary course of business.' 57 Alberta and British
Columbia protect only those creditors whose rights have been crystalized under,
e.g., a writ of execution or who are represented by the appointment of e.g., a
trustee in bankruptcy.'5 8
Basically two courses of action are open to the conditional vendor upon
default of the terms of the contract by the purchaser. They are an action for
the purchase price and repossession of the goods. These rights are alternative.
If the seller elects to sue for the price, obtains judgmnt and then levies on the
same goods that were sold under the conditional sale agreement, two provinces
restrict the seller's right of recovery to the amount realized on the resale of
these goods.' 59 On the other hand, if the seller elects to repossess the goods he
will be barred from suing for the price' 60 except to the extent that a deficiency
action is for the price and then only in those provinces where action for the
deficiency is permited, and the agreement has provided for the right.10'
Not all jurisdictions have repossession procedures in their conditional sales
acts. Those that do generally draw some distinction depending on the nature
of the goods. For example, most of the provinces have special provisions regu-
lating goods affixed to land.' 62 Saskatchewan gives special treatment to house-
trailers;' 63 and British Columbia has special provisions governing the reposses-
sion of motor vehicles. 164
Under the general provisions governing repossession the seller is usually
156. Model Conditional Sales Act. § 3.
157. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(3) (1960).
158. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 3(1) (1955); B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 15 (1960).
159. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 19(4) (1955); Newf. Rev. Stat. bill 62, § 12(5) (1952).
160. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 19(3) (1955); Newf. Rev. Stat. bill 62, § 12(4) (1952).
Butler v. Traders Fin. Corp., 49 W.W.R. (ns.) 480, 47 D.L.R.2d 260 (Alta. 1964); General
Securities, Ltd. v. Lyons, 22 W.W.R. (ns.) 145, 8 D.L.R.2d 652 (B.C. 1957); Commercial
Accept. Corp. v. Partridge, [1956] Rev. Leg. 193 (Can.); Obee v. Laffey, [1954] Ont. W.N.
510.
161. B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 14(3) (1960); Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 9(2) (1960);
Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 16(3) (1965); Humphrey Motors, Ltd. v. Ells, [1935] Can. S.Ct.
249, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 705 (Man.); Adelkind v. Amies, 25 Sask. 87, [1931] 1 D.L.R. 181;
Arnold v. Playter, 22 Ont. 608 (1892).
162. Model Conditional Sales Act §§ 15(14)-(20). This act contains no general pro-
cedure. See also B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, §§ 12(8) -(10) (1960) (as amended); Newf. Rev. Stat.
bill 62, §§ 14(8)-(14) (1952) (as amended 1955); Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, §§ 19(9)-(15)
(1965). Alberta: Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 16 (1955), and Ontario: Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61,
§ 10 (1960) go no further than to permit the land owner to pay the balance owing on the
contract and to retain the goods.
163. Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, §§ 14, 15 (1965).
164. B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 14(8) (1960).
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required to retain the goods for a specified period-anywhere from fourteen
days to one month-during which time the buyer may redeem the goods on
payment of the balance of the price plus the cost of repossession. 165 If the buyer
fails to redeem within the time allowed the vendor may resell the goods, usually
privately or at public auction.166 If the seller intends to look to the buyer for
any deficiency, in those jurisdictions where it is permitted, he is generally re-
quired to deliver a notice with appropriate contents to the buyer usually five to
seven days before the sale which, of course, may not be held before the expira-
tion of the redemption period. 167 In the event a surplus is realized it must be paid
to the buyer.168
To some extent a third remedy in the nature of foreclosure exists in some
jurisdictions. For example, in Alberta a judge may order that the goods seized
be delivered to the vendor in full or part satisfaction of all claims.169 In British
Columbia if a motor vehicle is to be resold by public auction the seller may
enter a reserve price and if it is not met the vehicle may be withdrawn from
the bidding. Following a demand for payment of this sum and the expiration of
seven days without receipt of payment, the buyer's interest in the motor vehicle
is absolutely determined. The seller becomes the owner and the buyer is relieved
of the obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price.
170
ONTARIO'S PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY AcT, 1967
Even a cursory examination of the relevant chattel security law of Canada
would not be adequate without adverting to Ontario's Personal Property Security
Act, 1967. This Act, as earlier observed, corresponds roughly to Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Early drafts originated in a committee organized by
the Ontario Commercial Law Section of the Canadian Bar Association in 1960,
chaired by Mr. Fred M. Catzman. Because of its singular importance, the
work was later taken under the aegis of the Attorney General, and after further
development and various amendments in the committee stage, Bill 88, as the
165. The Seizures Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 307, §§ 28-30 (1955) (fourteen days); B.C.
Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 14(1) (1960) (twenty days); Man. Rev. Stat. c. 144, § 3(1) (1954)
(twenty days); Newf. Rev. Stat. bill 67, § 2 (1952) (as amended 1962) (one month); Ont.
Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 9(1) (1960 (twenty days); Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 16(1) (1965)
(twenty days). The Model Act has no provisions for general repossession.
166. The Seizures Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 307, § 30(1)(b) (1955); B.C. Rev. Stat.
c. 70, § 14(2) (1960); Newf. Rev. Stat. bill 62, § 12(2) (1952); Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393,§ 16(2) (1965).
167. B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 14(3) (1960) (five days); Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 9(4)
(1960); Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 393, § 16 (1965) (five to seven days depending on whether
it is served personally or by mail). Alberta requires a five-day notice to be served even
though deficiency actions are not allowed, and services may be personal or by mail. Alta.
Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 19(3), and The Seizures Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 307, § 30(1) (b) (1955)
(five days). Newfoundland also specifically precludes deficiency claims. Newf. Rev. Stat.
bill 62, § 12(3) (1952).
168. The Seizures Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 307, § 30(2)(b) (1955); Newf. Rev. Stat.
bill 62, § 12(9) (1952).
169. The Seizures Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 307, § 29(4) (b) (1955).
170. B.C. Rev. Stat. c.70, § 14(8) (1960).
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most recent version is known, was passed and received Royal asset on June 15,
1967.171
Similar to Article 9 the Act permits the creation of a "security agreement"
which is designed to supersede the traditional chattel mortgage, conditional
sale, equipment trust, floating charge (to the extent that it is not regulated by
The Corporation Securities Registration Act), assignments of book debts not
intended as security, pledge, trust deed, trust receipt, and "an assignment, lease
or consignment intended as security."'1 72 The bill of sale, as distinguished from
the chattel martgage, is not within the definition of a security agreement, and
thus it is not regulated by the new Act, but rather by the Bills of Sale Act, 1967
(Bill 93), almost identical to relevant provisions of the old act except that some
modernization in terminology has taken place. Royal assent put into effect sec-
tions 41 to 43, 45, 70 and 71, dealing primarily with the implementation of a
central filing system for security interests which will ultimately be governed
by the new act, the establishment of an assurance fund, and permission to
the Lieutenant Governor in Council to make regulations regarding the imple-
mentation and administration of matters which will fall under the Act. The
remaining provisions, the major body of the new law, will not come into force
until a day named by the Lieutenant Governor. 173
In view of the time that must elapse before the major provisions of the
Act will become operational no direct attempt will be made to compare it with
Article 9 except to say that it is similar. While a critical examination of a few
of its aspects and the policies governing its development would seem to be in
order, although this is not the place for an exhaustive analysis. Thus the follow-
ing comments will be only representative in character.
Besides the advent of Ontario's Act symbolizing a needless compromise
in the over-all development of Canada's commercial law, it is deserving of
criticism on its own merits. In the first place it takes too narrow an approach by
excluding the absolute assignment and sale of contract rights, chattel paper, 7 "7
and all floating charges falling within The Corporation Securities Registration
Act.17 5
The Act is also inherently objectionable in that it is highly inconsistent in
style. Sometimes terminology of Article 9 is replaced by wording derived from
prevailing Canadian law; 176 other times the wording of Article 9 is relied upon
171. For commentary on and criticism of earlier drafts, much of which is still pertinent,
see Catzman, The Uniform Commercial Code In Canada, 22 Bus. Law. 209 (1966); Feltham,
New Developments in Security On Inventory, 15 U. N.B. L.J. (1965); Ziegel, The Legal
Problems of Wholesale Financing of Durable Goods in Canada, 41 Can. B. Rev. 54 (1963).
172. [19671 Ont. Stat. bill 88 [hereinafter cited Bill 881.
173. Bill 88, § 72 and explanatory note. A three year transition period governing registra-
tion will commence January 1, 1969, and the rest of the provisions of the Act will become fully
effective on January 1, 1972. Richard E. Priddle, Ass't Inspector of Legal Offices, Memo to
All County & District Court Clerks Province of Ontario, July 17th, 1967.
174. Negative Implication, bill 88, § 2(b).
175. Id. § 3.
176. E.g., "Financing statement" is replaced by "notice of intention," a term derived
from the Bank Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 12, (1952) as amended, [1966-67] Can. Stat. c. 87,
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heavily.177 But in the majority of instances changes are made in phraseology
seemingly for no other reason than to be different. As a simple illustration of
this compare section 26(3):
Beyond the period of ten days referred to in subsection 1 or 2, a se-
curity interest under this section becomes subject to the provisions of
this Act for perfecting a security interest.
with section 9-304(6) of the Uniform Commercial Code:
After the twenty-one day period in subsection (4) and (5) perfection
depends upon compliance with applicable provisions of this Article.
It will be observed that the Ontario version requires half again as many words
to express the same idea, presumably, contained in Article 9. Thi does not
happen often, but very seldom does the Act delete seemingly "excess verbiage"
without also deleting some ideas. The over-all result is a potpourri of North
American chattel security law, vastly inferior to Article 9 and to what an
unpretentious effort on the part of the draftsmen might have achieved. This
is not to suggest that Article 9 is without its weaknesses. Indeed the Personal
Property Security Act has some features which are an improvement over
Article 9. For example, section 5(1) of the Personal Property Security Act
integrates the content of U.C.C. § 9-103(1) and (2) into a single subsection,
thereby eliminating one of the choice of law rules. That is, there seems to be
no good reason why accounts and contract rights deserve a different treatment
than general intangibles and certain ambulatory collateral. The Ontario Act
adopts the "chief place of business of a debtor" as the appropriate connecting
factor in both instances.
The title page contains the label "An Act to reform and make uniform the
Law regarding Security Interests in Personal Property and Fixtures." One might
ask, uniform to what? Certainly not with the law of other provinces since they
do not have such an act, nor were any of the provinces invited to participate
in its development. If it was to be uniform with the law of the United States
why did the draftsmen needlessly depart from the format of Article 9? Obviously
some changes in form and substance are necessary to accommodate the differ-
ences between the two systems, but if international uniformity is desirable, and
surely it is, why make changes that are not necessary, i.e., those that are not
based upon considered, sound policy? Mr. Catzman explains the approach taken
is based on the necessity of converting the "readable prose" of Article 9 into
the "traditionally ...terse, concise and precise terms" of Ontario legislative
style so that the conservative Ontario legislature would more readily adopt
it.178 Although the Act is more concise than Article 9, the "tradition" is
§ 88(4) (a) (1967); "caution" is an innovation derived from Ontario's Conditional Sales
Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 12 (1960), by which notice may be given to certain parties.
"Holding" is another innovation. See Bill 88, §§ 48, 28, 34.
177. See e.g.,Bill 88, §§ 35-38.
178. Catzman,The Uniform Commercial Code in Canada, 22 Bus. Law. 209, 210 (1966).
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largely mythical and the more relaxed style of Article 9 would be con-
sistent with other Ontario legislation. He goes on to indicate that various
American authorities in the field attended a critical study seminar of an
earlier draft at Osgoode Hall in 1964,179 the implication apparently being that
these experts gave some sort of sanction or assent to the product. But con-
sidering the fact that the draft did not even contain a notice filing provision
at that time-the very heart of a modern inventory financing law-one
suspects that the acquiescence, if any, was evoked more by the desire of
good neighbors to avoid the appearance of a DeGaulle in Montreal than a
conviction that the draft was even close to a model act. In fairness to Mr.
Catzman, however, it must be said that several of the desirable objectives sought
by his committee were rejected by the Law Reform Commission, and this body
has made several undesirable innovations of its own. In any event, Canadian
lawyers and judges of the future will undoubtedly look to American commentary
and cases relative to Article 9 for guidance in construing their own Act, only to
be faced with the thorny question of whether the verbal changes were intended
to effect a change in substance or only in form.
Moreover the Act reveals signs of poor organization,180 unnecessary repe-
tition, 81 and inconsistency in policy.' 82
Notwithstanding the obviously great amount of work and thought that has
gone into the Ontario Act, unfortunately it cannot be recommended as being
worthy of acceptance by the other provinces.
THE FLOATING CHARGE
The floating charge arose in England under a series of decisions in the
latter part of the nineteenth century,183 and is peculiar to the British Common-
wealth. The device was subjected to statutory regulation in England by the
179. Id. at 210-11.
180. E.g., Under Bill 88, part III: Perfection of Interest, no mention is made of
priorities-a unique and highly significant feature; rather, the first section thereunder relates
to attachment, an element of perfection to be sure, followed immediately by id. § 22.
Cf. UCC § 9-301 dealing with priorities. Bill 88, § 23 then returns to perfection. Other
major priority provisions are not mentioned until id. § 30. Although the order is approxi-
mately that of UCC Art. 9, the arrangement could be improved.
181. Cf. Bill 88, § 28(1), with id. § 24(f), and id. § 35(1) (b). Id. §§ 28(2) (a), (b) are
also repetitions. Subsec. (b) is only a variation of (a), i.e., the greater, "holding on behalf
of" would include the lesser, "issuing a document of title in the name of." In turn, § 28(2) (b)
is already covered by § 24(b). Thus § 28(2) (b) makes reference to bailee only to repeat in
more narrow terms what was already established in § 24(b), but without indicating the
time when perfection in this instance is established-the only good reason for singling out
a bailee for special treatment and the only reason Article 9 does so (see UCC § 9-305). Section
28(2) (c) is a repeat of § 25(1) (b). Instances could be multiplied. But this is to be expected.
When a parent act is well drafted unnecessary repetition in a sibling act is almost inevitable
under a policy of change for the sake of change. *
182. Cf id. § 36(3) which permits named parties to take priority over a secured party's
interest in fixtures if they acquire their interest "without actual notice," whereas the same
parties may prevail in the case of accessions provided they are "without notice." Id. § 37(2).
It is submitted that in this era there is no justification for the requirement of actual notice
to subsequent third parties before the secured party's interest will be protected.
183. Pennington, The Genesis of The Floating Charge, 23 Mod. L. Rev. 630 (1960).
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Companies Act,' 84 and similar provisions were incorporated into Canada's
Dominion Companies Act of 1917.185 Little provincial legislation existed until
the development of the uniform Corporation Securities Registration Act in
1931, but now all jurisdictions except the North West Territories have acts
regulating the floating charge. Four of the provinces and the Yukon have
adopted the uniform act, 8 6 and Alberta, British Columbia, and Manitoba
have acts similar to the provisions of the English Companies Act, 1948.187 In
most jurisdictions only charges (specific or floating) which are contained in a
trust deed, in bonds or debentures as well as in a trust deed, or in bonds and
debentures separate from a trust deed, are regulated by the Corporation Securi-
ties Registration Acts and related acts. 88 Thus corporate chattel mortgages not
contained in such documents are regulated by the Bills of Sales Acts.
The floating charge is equitable in nature and derives its name from the
fact that it contemplates a mere general charge on specified present and future
corporate assets which are expected to be changing in the ordinary course of
business.' 80 It is distinguishable from the American floating lien which in con-
trast is "legal" and "specific.1'19° The floating charge remains inchoate or
"uncrystalized" until the secured party takes steps to enforce his security
interest or unless the business ceases to be a going concern.' 9 ' Until either of
these events occurs, the debtor may deal freely with the collateral by way of
sale, mortgage or other disposition and even execution and garnishment creditors
can subject the assets to process without hindrance of the floating charge.' 9 2
184. Companies Act, 63 & 64 Vict. c. 48, § 14 (1900).
185. The Companies Act Amendment Act, [19171 Can. Stat. c. 25. Cf. Ont. Rev. Stat.
c. 178, § 82(2) (1914).
186. Corporation Securities Registration Act, N.S. Rev. Stat. c. 56 (1954); The
Corporation Securities Registration Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 70 (1960); The Corporation
Securities Reristration Act, P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. 34 (1951); The Corporation Securities Reg-
istration Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 394 (1965); The Corporation Securities Registration Act,
[1963] Yuk. Terr. Ord. c. 3.
187. The Alberta Companies Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 53, §§ 2, 99-104 (1955); The
British Columbia Companies Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 67, §§ 2, 137, 138, 202 (1960); The
Manitoba Companies Act, Man. Rev. Stat. c. 43, §§ 2(g), 430-33, (1954); cf. The Companies
Act, Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 168, §§ 70-74 (1952).
188. Model Conditional Sales Act § 3. The acts in Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba,
and Newfoundland regulate all corporate floating charges whether or not they secure bonds
or debentures.
189. Matter of Yorkshire Woolcombers Association, [1903] Ch. 284, 295.
190. See Coogan & Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of The Uniform Commercial Code
on The Corporate Indenture, 69 Yale L.J. 203, 204, 233 (1959) for an interesting discussion
of the legality and feasibility of including in an American corporate indenture, by virtue of
the development of UCC art. 9, collateral which is normally taken as security only in short-
term financing. Collateral of this nature has been the subject of the Canadian and
English floating charge for about a hundred years-a testimony of the usefulness of
the device notwithstanding its disadvantages.
191. A mere default or demand is not sufficient to cause the floating charge to attach.
Governments Stock & Other Securities Inv. Co. v. Manila Ry. Co., [1897] A.C. 81; Matter
of Panama, New Zealand & Aust. Royal Mail Co., [1870] L.R. 5 Ch. App. 318.
192. Kare v. North West Packers, Ltd., 63 Man. 16, [1955] 2 D.L.R. 407, 14 W.W.R.
(n.s.) 251; Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries, Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 979. It will be recalled, how-
ever, that a corporation is free to create a specific as well as a floating charge.
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This device is used almost exclusively as an instrument for long-term cor-
porate financing, although some have suggested that it has been used for means
other than raising capital directly.193 Although collateral that may be the sub-
ject of a floating charge is usually limited to personnal property, including book
debts,1' 4 it is in some instances extended to real property, 195 while excluding some
forms of personal property in others.1 6 Typically the floating charge is used in
conjunction with a real estate mortgage embodied in a trust deed for the pur-
pose of including the balance of a corporation's personal property assets, or a
certain class thereof, as security for bonds or debentures to be issued by the
borrower.
Certainly its name suggests, and some of its characteristics make it appear,
that the floating charge might be ideal for inventory financing. However, the
fact that the secured party has merely an equitable right until the charge
crystalizes by the happening of an appropriate event would seem to be a lethal
defect in the floating charge as an inventory financing device, since creditors
and transferees out of the ordinary course of business, assuming they are bona
fide, could prevail over the secured party. Close policing would minimize these
risks but would require an increase in the cost with the result that it would
probably be impractical. 19 7
Although it is permissible to create a floating charge by appropriate wording
in the body of "bonds, debenture stock or any series of bonds or debentures,"'9 8
the common practice in Canada is to include the charge in a trust deed.199 No
special form of wording or minimum standard of description of the collateral
is stipulated, but an illustration of a description in a trust deed which was found
sufficient to cover all the corporation's personal property is "the undertaking
and all their property and assets, both present and future . . . to the intent
that this debenture shall be a floating security on the said undertaking and
property." 20 0 Where real property is to be included, additional language charg-
ing the property by way of legal mortgage would be required. Only when the
charge is not secured by a separate instrument, i.e., by a trust deed, is the
consideration specifically required to be set out in an affidavit of the mortgagor
193. Feltham, New Developments In Security On Inventory, 15 U. N.B.L.J. 1, 17 n.57
(1965).
194. Model Conditional Sales Act § 3(1).
195. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 53, § 99(1) (1955); B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 67, §§ 137(1), (5)
(1960); Man. Rev. Stat. c. 43, §§ 430-33, 436 (1954).
196. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 53, § 99(10) (1955).
197. Regarding the use of the floating charge to secure future advances see Meen v.
Realty Dev., Ltd., [1954] Ont. W.N. 193, [1954] 1 D.L.R. 649.
198. Model Conditional Sales Act § 3(1); Matter of Farmer's Loan & Sav. Co. (Deben-
ture Holders' Case), 30 Ont. 337 (1899); Gordon McKay, Ltd. v. JA. Larocque, Ltd., 59
Ont. L.R. 293 (1926). No distinction is made between a bond and debenture in Canada.
199. National Trust Co. v. Trusts & Guar. Co., 24 Ont. L.R. 286, 19 Ont. W.R. 631
(1911).
200. Gordon MacKay, Ltd. v. J.A. Larocque, Ltd., 59 Ont. L.R. 293, 304, [1926] 3
D.L.R. 864, 864-65, rev'd [1927] Can. S. Ct. 374, [1927] 2 D.L.R. 1150 (1927).
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to satisfy a filing requirement. 20 1 However, as a matter of practice the actual
consideration would generally appear in the trust deed.
Prior to 1927 it was generally thought that a floating charge regulated by
provincial legislation was not required to be registered since it was not considered
to be within the definition of a mortgage in the Bills of Sale and Chattel
Mortgages Act,2 0 2 and the little provincial legislation that did permit registra-
tion did not affix a penalty for failure to file.20 3 England, however, did require
registration at this time,204 and similar requirements were inserted in the
Dominion Companies Act in 1917.205 Then in 1927 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that a floating charge contained in a trust deed executed by an
Ontario corporation was void for want of registration pursuant to the Bills of
Sale and Chattel Mortgages Act.20 6 Undoubtedly this decision precipitated the
development of the uniform act promulgated by the Conference on Uniform
Legislation in 1931, and the subsequent adoption by the provinces of the same
or similar legislation.
All jurisdictions having legislation provide for central filing of the instru-
ment with the registrar of companies or a similar entity within a specified time
on pain of invalidity as against third parties.20 7 Where real property is the sub-
ject of a floating charge, registration in the relevant land registry office is also
required.20 8 The time for registration varies from ten to sixty days from execu-
tion of the charge within the province and up to ninety days in the case of
Alberta if the execution takes place outside the province. 20 9 In several instances
the floating charge is expressly stated to "take effect" as against third parties
only from the time of registration.2 10 In the event of failure to file in time,
a court order may be obtained for an extension of time if the failure was due
to inadvertance, but the right to file is subject to the accrued rights of persons
who have actually been misled as a result of the late filing.2 11
Failure to file in time invalidates the floating charge as against "creditors
of the mortgagor or assignor, and as against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees
from or under the mortgagor or assignor, in good faith, for valuable considera-
201. Model Conditional Sales Act § 4(2).
202. Capital Trust Co. v. Yellowhead Pass Coal & Coke Co., 9 Alta. 463, 30 D.L.R.
468, 34 W.L.R. 982 (1916).
203. Cf. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 178, § 82(2) (1914).
204. Companies Act, 63 & 64 Vict. c. 48, § 14(1) (d) (1900).
205. Dominion Companies Act Amendment Act, [1917], Can. Stat. c. 25, § 9.
206. Gordon MacKay, Ltd. v. J.A. Larocque, Ltd., [1927] Can. S. Ct. 374, [1927]
2 D.L.R. 1150.
207. Model Conditional Sales Act § 4(1).
208. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 53, § 99(4) (1955); B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 67, § 137(5) (1960);
Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 168, § 70(10) (1952).
209. Model Conditional Sales Act § 4(1); Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 53, § 99(1) (1955)
(sixty days from "creation") ; B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 67, § 137(1) (1960) (ten days from crea-
tion); Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 168, § 70(1) (1952).
210. Model Conditional Sales Act§ 3(3). See Consol. Fin. Co. v. Alfke, 31 W.W.R.
(n.s.) (Alta.) for case construing the phrase "takes effect" in the Bills of Sale Act.
211. Model Conditional Sales Act §§ 8, 9.
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tion and without notice .. ,,212 Like the chattel mortgage and conditional sales
legislation, the acts do not expressly state the consequences of timely filing, but
it is implied that due compliance with the registration requirement would vali-
date the charge as to the named third parties. However, this implication must
be qualified considerably in the case of a floating charge as opposed to a specific
charge, which as noted earlier, the acts also govern, since the debtor may deal
freely with the collateral and third parties may acquire prior rights in it until
the secured party's rights have crystalized. Thus a more complete statement is
that timely filing gives a secured party whose rights have crystalized, priority
over third parties whose rights arise thereafter.21
The parties are free to stipulate the conditions which will constitute default,
thereby giving the secured party the right to enforce his security. In addition,
enforcement may be had if the debtor ceases to carry on business214 or if the
security is placed in jeopardy.215
The scope and mode of enforcement are analogous to the remedies available
to a mortgagee who is entitled either to foreclose on the mortgage or to sue on
the covenant. If the charge is embodied in the debenture, debenture holders
may have foreclosure.210 Where the charge is contained in a collateral trust
deed, however, earlier cases have thrown some doubt on the availability of this
remedy, perhaps because legal title remains in the debtor until crystalization, 217
but a comparatively recent case has allowed foreclosure.218 In any event there
is general agreement that the secured party may enforce by sale.
As a concomitant of enforcement a receiver or a receiver and manager must
be appointed either by the bondholders or the trustee, as dictated by the terms
of the deed, or by the court. The consequences flowing from appointment under
a power are different from those under appointment by the court.210
Bondholders are the proper parties to initiate enforcement of the security 20
unless the deed has limited this right to the trustee,221 which is usually the case.
It is therefore apparent that the deed must always be examined to resolve this
212. Model Conditional Sales Act § 3(1); cf. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 53, § 99(1) (1955);
B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 67, § 137(1) (1960); Man. Rev. Stat. c. 43, § 43(1) (1954); Newf. Rev.
Stat. c. 168, § 70(1) (1952).
213. Canada Trust Co. v. Bank of Montreal, 37 D.L.R.2d 654 (B.C. 1963); Kare v.
North West Packers, Ltd., 63 Man. 16, [1955) 2 D.L.R. 407, 14 W.W.R. 251; Government
Stock Co. v. Manila Ry., [1896] A.C. 81 (1897). A § 88 security under the Bank Act
will prevail over a floating charge taken to secure bonds. Dominion Iron & Steel Co. v.
Canadian Bank of Commerce, [1928] 1 D.L.R. 809 (ns.).
214. Hodson v. Tea Co., 14 Ch. D. 859 (1880).
215. Trusts & Guar. Co. v. Drumheller Power Co., [1924] 2 D.L.R. 787, [1924] 1
W.W.R. 1112 (Alta.).
216. Sadler v. Worley, [1894] 2 Ch. 170.
217. Schweitzer v. Mayhew, 31 Beav. Ry. & C. Cas. 37 (Eng. 1862).
218. Matter of Corp. Equitable Property Soc., Ltd., [1940] W.N. 208.
219. W. Fraser & J. Stewart, Company Law of Canada, 448451 (5th ed. 1960).
220. Perron v. L'Eclaireur & Nadeau, 57 Que. K.B. 445 (1933); Shaughnessy v.
Imperial Trust Co., 3 N.B. Eq. 5 (1904).
221. Levis County Ry. Co. v. Fontaine, 13 Que. K.B. 523 (1904).
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as well as a host of other questions which pertain to the proper administration
of this form of security.
QUEBEc LAW
A glance at relevant Quebec law will complete the study of Canadian
chattel security law most likely to have a bearing on international transactions
between citizens of the United States and Canada. Until recently there was
very little legislative sanction of non-possessory personal property security
devices in Quebec, outside of the agricultural pledge2 2 and the corporate mort-
gage of "movables" or personal property to secure bonds and debentures.2 23 Cur-
rently, transactions approximating those consummated under the conditional sales
contract and the chattel mortgage are permitted under Quebec law, although
they are restricted by considerably greater functional limitations than exist in
the common law jurisdictions. Except in the area covered by the section 88
security device available to chartered banks---"a breath.-takingly modern and
streamlined device" compared to Quebec's chattel security law2 2 4 -a constant
struggle has been waged by commercial entities, financiers, and jurists to adapt
an archaic chattel security law, central to which is the pledge concept, to the
economic and financing needs of the twentieth century, especially those which
have arisen since World War I.
In 1914 legislation was enacted which empowered certain corporations to
hypothec, mortgage or pledge their movable and immovable property, present
or future, by trust deed as security for bonds or debentures without the necessity
of transferring physical possession of the collateral to the trustee.225 Accordingly
the device may be used to secure the balance owing on sales; paid for in bonds,
as well as to secure loans against bonds. The security interest is specific, similar
to the type encountered in the United States, in contrast with the floating charge
which remains inchoate until crystalized. 226 However, the secured party's in-
terest is somewhat comparable to a floating charge in the sense that it is relegated
to a comparatively low privilege.2 27
In the field of non-corporate lending, commercial inconvenience led to the
development of various conventions which usually take the form of a "sale" or
"lease" of the goods with a right of redemption in the borrower upon payment
of the "price." This is accomplished either in a single document of sale, or in
one document of sale followed by another document in the nature of an install-
ment sales agreement back to the "seller." No publicity for the benefit of third
parties is afforded since registration is not required. Such transactions are valid
222. Que. Civ. Code arts. 1979(a)-1979(d) (1965) [hereinafter cited QCCI.
223. Special Corporate Powers Act, Que. Rev. Stat. c. 275, §§ 22-24 (1964).
224. Le Dain, Security Upon Moveable Property in the Province of Quebec, 2 McGill
L.J. 77, 103 (1956).
225. Que. Rev. Stat. c. 275, §§ 22, 23 (1964).
226. See supra note 190.
227. The privilege ranks after those mentioned in QCC arts. 1994-1994(c); Que. Rev.
Stat. c. 275, § 24 (1964).
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between the parties, and while a few judges have shown a disposition to validate
them as against third parties, 228 the prevailing view is that third parties take
priority over the "vendor" or "lessor." 229 However, fear of invalidation has not
prevented these devices from flourishing, and the prediction has been made
that they will receive judicial approval in the near future, 230 although it has
been thought that there is "no good reason why the law should be amended to
permit lenders in the personal loan field to obtain security upon movable
property without transfer of possession.")231
Presumably in response to at least part of the needs in this area, the Civil
Code was amended in 1962 to permit the creation of a "commercial pledge" - ' -'
-Quebec's nearest equivalent to the chattel mortgage. This permits "a person
carrying on a commercial business" to secure a loan "which he contracts" by
way of a non-possessory pledge of his "machinery and equipment," which will
preserve the lender's rights against third parties. 233 Registration is required.2- 1 1
Unfortunately the device is far too inflexible to satisfy several major needs for
a valid non-possessory pledge. As was indicated, its use is limited to "a person
carrying on a business" so that personal loans are excluded; it may not be used
to secure other than loans "which he contracts"--suretyship transactions would
be excluded; and since the collateral is restricted to "machinery and equipment"
with no mention of "present or future goods," inventory financing would be
out of the question. 235
In 1947 Quebec added provisions to the Civil Code to regulate installment
sales of what might be described generally as consumer goods not exceeding the
price of $800.236 This law contains considerably more consumer protection than
the typical conditional sales act,2 37 and its application is limited to retail sales.238
The agreement must be in writing and comply substantially with the format
prescribed in the schedule, on penalty of being treated as a "sale with a term, -" 2 3 9
which is comparable to an absolute sale. Nevertheless the law is quite similar to
228. Ind. Accept. Corp. v. Marmette, [1957] Que. B.R. 861; Garage Central d'Amos
v. Lamarre, [1955] Que. B.R. 725; Belanger v. Desjardins, 32 R.P. 317 (1929).
229. Conover v. Commercial Corp. & Shelcher [1950] Que. B.R. 116; Thompson &
Alix, Ltd. v. Lapierre, 72 Que. C.S. 460 (1934).
230. Briere, La Propriete Mobiliere et le Commerce, 18 Rev. du Bar. 169, 171 (1958).
231. Le Dain, supra note 224 at 112.
232. QCC arts. 1979(e)-1979(k).
233. Id. art. 1979(e); Comtois, Une Nouvelle Legislation; Le Nantissement Com-
mercial, 9 McGill L.J. 261, 267 (1963).
234. Id. art. 1979(e).
235. Comtois supra note 233, 261-265.
236. QCC arts. 1561(a)-1561(j). Agricultural "things," equipment, books, artificial
limbs, and mortor vehicles are expressly excluded. Id. art. 1561(j). For provisions regulating
sales, see generally id. arts. 1472-1561. Of particular interest are id arts. 1497, 1539, 1541,
1543, 1546.
237. The initial payment must be at least 15% of the total price; the balance must be
paid in equal monthly installments; rebates of finance charges must be made for early pay-
ment of the balance-which is always permitted; a statement of the differential between
the cash and time price is required; finance charges are fixed; and the print must be at
least six point type. Id. arts. 1561(b), (c), (d), (e).
238. Id. art. 1461(j).
239. Id. art. 1461(i).
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conditional sales law in the sense that the vendor retains "ownership" of the
goods until the buyer has paid the price.10 On default of payment the seller
may either sue for the price or "revendicate" (repossess) the goods. In the latter
case the seller has no right to the balance of the price nor is the buyer entitled
to the return of the money already paid.2 1
Although the Civil Code makes no provision for filing the agreement, the
vendor has the right to revendicate the goods ahead of the claims of the buyer's
creditors,242 and he is given a high-ranking priority or "privilege." 243 However,
this right is subject to defeat by a purchaser or pledgee who become such pur-
suant to "a commercial matter," or subsequent to the goods being lost or stolen
if the purchaser or pledgee takes the goods in good faith "in a fair or market,
or at a public sale (or pledge) or from a trader . . . dealing in similar arti-
cle(s) .... 1244 It is true that "lost or stolen" have been construed to include
even a wrongful sale or pledge by the buyer, in which case the vendor would
be permitted to recover the things from the purchaser or pledgee. 245 But this
would be of little comfort to vendors in most cases since they must reimburse
the subsequent purchaser or pledgee the amount he has paid as a condition
precedent to revendication. 246 This would seem to be only fair, however, since
no means of self-protection in the nature of a filing system is available to the
subsequent purchaser or pledgee.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps a comment ought to be made in summary concerning the relative
merits of one device to another. Assuming it has been determined that a chattel
security device is desirable in a given international transaction, there remains
the question of which one ought to be used. Of course the choice depends
largely on the nature of the transaction, but since large continental transactions
frequently involve both loans and sales, the evaluation ought to begin with the
charge governed by the Corporate Securities Registration Acts and correspond-
ing Quebec law because of its highly flexible nature. In the common law juris-
dictions, as well as Quebec, the device may be used to finance the sale of goods
as well as to secure a loan. Moreover, in the common law jurisdictions either
a specific or floating charge is available and the choice between them would
depend on the intensity of security desired. In Quebec, by virtue of its rank
among the various privileges, the corporate hypothec of movables lies some-
where between a specific and floating charge. The charge should also be con-
sidered in every instance where only a large corporate loan is contemplated.
240. Id. art. 1561(a).
241. Id. art. 1561(f).
242. Le Dain, supra note 224, at 112.
243. QCC art. 1994.
244. Id. arts. 1487, 1488, 1489, 1966(a).
245. Le Dain, supra note 224, at 83; see also Mayrand, Le nantissement de la chose
d'autrid, 3 Rev. du Bar, 313, 316-17 (1943).
246. QCC art. 1489.
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However, where only a sale is involved or only a small loan, the cost and in-
convenience of drafting a trust deed and other documents required by this
device may be too expensive to justify its use. The conditional sales agreement
and chattel mortgage would then be considered. Of course, only the chattel
mortgage is available to secure a loan, but either a chattel mortgage or a con-
ditional sales contract may be used to secure the price in the case of a sale.
In the latter instance, the necessity of an absolute bill of sale to precede the
chattel mortgage, as well as the affidavit requirements, would probably result
in a choice of the conditional sales contract.
In conclusion, the Canadian provinces are as urgently in need of a revision
of their chattel security law as were the states of the United States prior to the
Uniform Commercial Code. Indeed, it suggests the need for modernizing and
rewriting the entire body of Canadian commercial law. Why should Canada
settle for anything less? Of course such an undertaking would be monumental,
as evidenced by the resources of talent and money required for the produc-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code. But in view of the importance of a
modern, functional system of commercial law to a potentially great trading
nation, one which is destined to rise to gigantic proportions in the century
ahead, 247 surely the investment would be worthwhile.
If this objective is beyond the vision of those who are in a position to
initiate such an undertaking, then admittedly revision ought to begin where the
need is greatest, namely, with secured transactions 248-but not with the ex-
pectation that this will lead to the development of a comprehensive commercial
code, as some have suggested. On the contrary, it seems likely that the perfect-
ing of a mere segment of the whole body, particularly one which is so demon-
strably in need of revision, will tend to destroy the impetus that would other-
wise accompany a movement to develop a comprehensive code-the penalty for
wanting too little too soon.
It appears unfortunate that Ontario has played a prima donna role in a
movement which so clearly demands the joint participation of all provinces.
Even if the rest of the provinces ultimately adopt Ontario's Personal Property
Security Act, the creation of a comprehensive code, assuming one is ultimately
developed, born of the approach and policies underlying the development of the
Ontario act would, ex hypothesi, be an inferior product. On the other hand,
if the Ontario act is rejected, there arises the possibility of each province devel-
oping a version of its own, thereby destroying any reasonable possibility of a
uniform commercial code for Canada in this century. In any event, it would
seem desirable that a firm stand for the drafting of a uniform act, independent
247. Canada's Next 100 Years, U.S. News & World Report, April 10, 1967, at 86.
248. In this regard it is interesting to note that the piece-meal development of Quebec's
chattel security law is highly reminiscent of the approach taken by the common law prov-
inces so that Quebec's need for an integrated law is just as acute as in the rest of Canada.
It is submitted that Article 9 would answer this need and that it would fit into the scheme
of Quebec's civil law system as gracefully as in the common law jurisdictions, given the
few changes in form and substance required for adaptation.
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of Ontario's Act, be taken by the Canadian Bar Association or some comparable
organization.
Not only does the foregoing indicate the need for a uniform interprovincial
law in the chattel security field, it also suggests the desirability of uniformity
in the entire field of commercial law of Canada and the United States. Even in
the area of secured transactions it is obvious that the chance of error and mis-
understanding in the use of chattel security devices in continental transactions
would be reduced to a minimum by a uniform law, especially an integrated law.
Moreover, uniformity would probably result in an increased use of chattel
security devices in such transactions. Certainly uniformity would remove the
hesitation that now exists by virtue of the mysteries inherent in the foreign
law. By the same token the advantages that would flow from uniformity to
attorneys and commercial entities in the United States would be mutually
available to corresponding parties in Canada.
/
